FRAGMENTS

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Freedom and Bad Faith

Hosanna Galea

This essay recounts the central claims that Sartre argues in his work Being and Nothingness[1], regarding bad faith and freedom, with reference to Sartre's assertion that "we have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is".[2] I argue that due to the ambivalence present in the term "freedom"—stemming from Sartre's new definition versus colloquial understandings of the term—Sartre's account of freedom is easily misconstrued to include a measure of degree. By analysing Sartre's position on freedom I conclude that Sartre's philosophy does not exclude the reality that individual facticities vary widely in regards to one's social status (due to factors such as race, class, and gender). Rather, Sartre's account of freedom is not defined as freedom from constraint, but by the action of pushing back against the determinism of the world; an action that is available to each individual, regardless of the number of constraints that a person has.

Freedom and Bad Faith

Bad faith is the condition of consciousness where a person attempts to make themselves into a self-identical, being-in-itself through self deception.[3] Bad faith is the state that individuals are most often in, and it is only temporarily that one can surface from it in their daily lives. Bad faith contains within it the apparent contradiction that consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is.[4] For example, if I say that I am a student then I am attempting to be what I am but in the mode of not being it because I can never wholly be anything. I can never wholly be anything because of a necessary condition of my consciousness; that of being a being-for-itself. As a being-for-itself I am not self-identical (or, a

1 I will hereafter refer to Sartre's Being and Nothingness as "BN"
2 Jean Paul Sartre, « Being and Nothingness » (Montreal: McGill University, 2015), 150.
3 Ibid, 139.
4 Ibid, 150.

being-in-itself) as a chair or a table would be. Because I am conscious and meaning making.

I can never wholly be one thing, like a student. I am in bad faith when I call myself a student because in doing so I attempt at being a being-in-itself.[5] Consciousness, in its perpetual othering of its past, is not actually what it is. Bad faith takes advantage of the non self-identity of itself, in order to continue in its own deception, thereby avoiding its own freedom in the ability to constitute itself.

To illustrate this point, Sartre uses the example of a waiter in a cafe.[6] The waiter, let us call him Andrew, is in a position to play out his social role as a waiter. In his attempt to play out this role, Andrew tries too hard, addressing customers and carrying his tray in a way that reveals his failure at attempting to be a being-in-itself. Andrew is objectifying himself through his attempt at being a waiter; in pre-reflectively losing himself in the act of being a waiter he is playing, and not succeeding, at being a being-in-itself. His actions are what Sartre calls pre-reflective because he is not aware of what he is doing, and he is losing himself in his actions because it is easier than addressing his freedom in that situation. Andrew's act of bad faith is in his denial of the fact that he is always making the choice to continue being a waiter. This means that his actions are also constituting his role as a waiter. Andrew is playing at being only a waiter; a self-identical object. He is doing this because the burden of choice-making is overwhelming. Bad faith is a resistance to the fact that Andrew has freedom as a being-for-itself, something which a being-in-itself will never have. Freedom is a continuous task that one must take up and renew meaning in every instance. Bad faith, in trying to make consciousness a thing-in-itself, attempts to flee this burden of freedom.

Freedom is a burden because it entails picking up one's past, present, and future and giving it meaning. One's past must be taken up and given meaning in order to give meaning to one's present, and future; actions in the present constitute your actions in the past, which then constitutes the being that you are now and in the future. This movement necessitates a responsibility that cannot be ignored or neglected. Each individual creates their own meaning that is facilitated by their freedom. Sartre illustrates this point using the example of war.[7] He addresses the individuals who declare themselves to be "opting out" of war, thus, in their eyes, remaining in a "neutral" position. Sartre argues that neutrality is not an option for anyone; people are still responsible for their actions, and the idea of "opting out" of choosing a side is, in itself, still a

5 Ibid, 151.
6 Ibid, 152.
7 Ibid, 278-279.

choice—one that does nothing but help the status quo, allowing the war to continue. There is nothing in this world that we have not already contributed to—whether in the mode of taking it up, or "choosing" not to. Similar to Andrew the cafe waiter, individuals who claim to not take up a position in the war are in bad faith by limiting their meaning making capacities as beings-for-themselves. In order to assert that it is possible to step outside of one's meaning making capacities is to disavow a fundamental part of one's personhood as a non self-identical being. When a person claims that they can remain neutral in wartime it is a mode of bad faith because they are claiming to be wholly one thing ("neutral"), but consciousness cannot be contained to one sole mode of being. Decisions made on the community level, such as the choice to go to war, reflect the subjectivity of individuals because people are continuously making choices in relation to the choice of the community. A person cannot separate themselves from their community because their decisions are mirrored in their society, and vise versa. Individual freedom relies on our meaning-making capacities, and it is because of this that there is no way to situate oneself outside of society; silence serves only to give power to the established norm.

When reading Sartre's account of freedom, it appears that Sartre's freedom contains degrees within it, and is connected to one's ability to have a social presence. If one has limiting social abilities (that of race, class, gender, etc) then it would stand to reason that it would be more difficult to push back against one's own facticity, and therefore, they would be less free. For example, a Black lesbian who grew up in the lower class would have less freedom than a white, male, bourgeois existentialist, due to the potentially debilitating facticity of her situation. Sartre uses the example of the master and the slave, arguing that the slave has just as much freedom as her master—despite their individual facticities being extremely different.[8] A more relatable example is that of the worker and the boss. Any person who has held a job within the lower realms of the business hierarchy knows from experience that they have less freedom than their "master". A factory worker can claim to have freedom during their shift, but they must still obey the demands of the foreperson lest they risk being fired. Despite the varying oppressive qualities of each individual's facticities, Sartre's philosophy unsettlingly argues that each individual has an equal freedom, regardless of the reality of their facticities. This claim runs counter to individual experience of freedom, as there are certain kinds of subjectivities that have more constraints than others.

While Sartre would not deny that the facticity of individuals are varied, in the above account freedom is being misconstrued to be determined

8 Ibid, 275.

by the result of one's facticity.[9] In actuality, freedom is not concerned with its consequences, but rather the capacity it has for constituting its subject. For individuals it is understood that facticity is predetermined, and that freedom is, in part, determined by facticity—just not the result of one's facticity. Facticity is a necessary element of life, and it is unique for each individual, and will yield unique results for each individual. What gives a person freedom, however, is their ability take up their facticity—regardless of what they are able to do with it due to social realities. Freedom is not the number of choices that an individual has, but the fact that choice is available to be taken up at all. Sartre is not denying that people have difficult facticities that are unique to themselves. But freedom is not defined by the result of facticity in one's life, but instead, the act of self constitution alone. It is for this reason that freedom is a blessing as well as burden. It is not the point at which you attain freedom, but the pushing back on facticity. One's own freedom lies solely in the act of continuing to constitute oneself against that tension. Social constraints put pressure on individuals, but individuals push back against that pressure by constituting themselves in unique ways. It does not matter how many restraints a person has within their society, because Sartrean freedom is not defined as freedom from constraint. Rather, freedom is the action of pushing back against the determinism that one is presented with in the world.

Sartre presents an interesting account of freedom, one that is defined in such a way that is unique from the traditional vernacular. This alternative definition can at first seem problematic, as it runs counter to the instincts of individuals who feel as though (using the traditional definition of freedom) they are less free than individuals with more money, a higher social status, and a socially accepted gender presentation. These claims are rendered without basis when re-examining Sartre's definition of freedom, discovering that in the Sartrean account freedom is not defined as freedom from constraint, but by one's capacity for meaning making in the world. Sartre sufficiently outlines the terms of his philosophy, and his main claims against a freedom containing degrees renders the arguments against his theory without basis. While it is true that individuals have unique facticities that determine their abilities, this reality does not play a part in determining the degree of freedom which is given to an individual. Freedom does not contain degrees within it, as all individuals are beings-for-themselves, and therefore equally free. The knowledge that we are equally free is frightening, and the burden of choice making that this entails can be overwhelming. This knowledge often causes an individual to fall into bad faith rather than confront their own freedom, but their reaction does not discount the freedom that the individual intrinsically has due to the nature of their being. Just as Andrew the cafe waiter is in bad faith by refusing

9 Ibid, 275.

to acknowledge his freedom as a being-for-itself, his facticity—his attempts at being a being-in-itself—do not make him less of a being-for-itself; an individual with freedom and meaning making capacities despite his individual facticity. Sartre's philosophy does not contest that individuals have varying facticities, but rather argues that freedom is not incremental, nor is it constituted by outcomes.

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La « faiblesse » de Choisy : une matrice inattendue exprimant un projet de macsulinité

La « faiblesse » de Choisy : une matrice inattendue exprimant un projet de macsulinité

Mackenzie J. Bleho

Les Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme permettent, à partir du point de vue unique d'un travesti, un examen de près des rapports de genre et de sexe au XVIIe siècle en France. D'une microlecture de ce texte, à la lumière de la philosophie contemporaine du genre et de sources exposant les attitudes historiques relatives à celui-ci, se dégage une définition éthico-normative de la masculinité. Cette définition se fonde sur la constatation de certaines caractéristiques ambiantes de la masculinité à l'époque, ainsi que sur une remise en question de ces caractéristiques qui ose positionner la condition masculine comme supplice plutôt que comme bénédiction. Tout au long de ces réflexions, le travestissement sert d'un cadre inattendu qui permet à l'abbé d'expérimenter plusieurs formes d'expression identitaire et qui lui permet également d'explorer de nombreuses définitions de la masculinité, que ce soit comme échelle comparant les hommes entre eux ou comme non-féminité. Les Mémoires de Choisy conjuguent ces plusieurs conceptions en mettant l'accent sur la réflexivité et l'agentivité de l'individu ayant le pouvoir de négocier sa propre identité. Or, deux codes éthiques s'imposent à cet individu apparemment libre : une logique hétérosexuelle obligatoire et le devoir de ne pas nuire à autrui.

[Hercules] spins by [Omphale's] side among her women, while she covers herself with the lion's skin, and arms herself with the club of her hero.

Bibliotheca Classica, John Lemprière. Cité dans Chloe Chard, « Effeminacy, pleasure and the classical body, » dans Femininity and Masculinity in Eighteenth-Century Art and Culture, dirigé par Gill Perry et Michael Rossington, (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), page 144.

Les Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, récit à la première personne des expériences d'un homme travesti plongé dans l'univers des femmes, présentent un point de vue singulier qui permet un examen de près des rapports de genre et de sexe à son époque. Il sera ici question du portrait d'une seule dimension de ces rapports, soit celle de

la masculinité, qui y est dressé, portrait combinant la simple constatation de certaines caractéristiques de la masculinité, la remise en question d'autres et le lancement d'un nouveau projet de masculinité, le tout exprimé dans le cadre de la matrice inattendue qu'est le travestissement. Il s'agira donc d'une microlecture des passages de ces Mémoires qui rapportent (explicitement ou implicitement) à la notion de masculinité et puis d'une analyse de ces passages à la lumière de sources exposant les attitudes par rapport au genre à l'époque et d'œuvres plus contemporaines traitant de la théorie du genre. On aboutira donc à une vue d'ensemble des discours sur la masculinité qui se trouvent chez Choisy, conjuguant des notions propres au texte, propres à l'époque et propres aux études du genre, et à une définition normative de la masculinité qui semble être avancée par Choisy.

Le mot « masculinité » évoque deux concepts différents à la fois, soit celui d'une réalité sexuelle physique (de la possession des organes génitaux masculins) et celui d'une échelle qualifiant le degré de réalisation par un individu d'un genre dit « masculin ». Dans les Mémoires de Choisy, il peut être surprenant, vu la prééminence qui y est accordée au travestissement, de constater que plusieurs aspects du traitement et de l'exploration de ce mot polysémique sont tout à fait en accord avec la vision qu'on en entretenait à l'époque. Ce conformisme aux normes genrées et sexuées dans le texte se révèle dans le traitement du rôle que joue la corporalité dans la constitution de l'identité masculine, dans les modalités de la culture masculine du libertinage et dans les avantages associés au fait d'être un homme.

La masculinité est affichée et est déterminée, d'abord, au niveau du corps, et cet affichage et cette détermination peuvent relever soit d'une performance intentionnelle[1] ou d'une réalité physique obligatoire. Dans le premier cas, il s'agit principalement de la manière dont l'individu décide de mettre son identité genrée en scène, par moyen, notamment, des habits et des soins de beauté. À l'époque dont il est question dans les Mémoires, le costume masculin comporte trois éléments principaux, dont la veste, le justaucorps et la culotte.[2] Sans ces trois articles, la masculinité affichée demeure incomplète ; être homme consiste largement à s'habiller en homme et à se soumettre à la mode de performance de son genre qui est attendue. Dans cette lignée, le narrateur des Mémoires signale l'achèvement de sa transformation en femme en soulignant que « [il ne se sert] plus de haut-de-chausses[3] [sic] »

1 Voir R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), page 54.

2 Voir André Blum, Histoire du costume. Les modes au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle (Paris : Librairie Hachette, 1928), page 97.

3 François-Timoléon de Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » dans Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy, éditées par Georges Mongrédien, (Paris : Éditions Mercure de France, 1966), page 293.

(prédécesseurs de la culotte). Ainsi, le passage final vers les habits féminins marque pour Choisy une rupture définitive avec son identité masculine (c'est du moins ce qu'il prétend à ce moment dans le texte). Cette adoption du travestissement, puisqu'il requiert que le travesti se défasse des signes physiques de sa masculinité afin d'être convaincant comme femme, est aussi révélatrice des traits plus particuliers exigés auprès des hommes. Il s'agit donc, dans ce cas, d'une définition négative de l'homme ; tout ce qui est recherché afin d'afficher une féminité vraisemblable est le contraire de ce qui conviendrait à un homme. Ainsi, être un homme implique avoir la poitrine plate,[4] être barbu (ou, du moins, pouvoir l'être),[5] se coiffer d'une manière donnée,[6] porter une perruque de style approuvé[7] et ne point se soucier de la blancheur de sa peau,[8] pour n'en nommer que les traits les plus saillants. Il y a donc présent dans ces Mémoires une vive conscience des exigences physiques de la masculinité. Or, en même temps, la déviance de Choisy par rapport à ces normes ne constitue pas un dépassement définitif de ces attentes. En fait, les iconographies féminisées de la masculinité[9] gagnent de plus en plus d'importance à cette époque ; on considère, en général, que la sublimité du corps masculin consiste à un mélange bien pesé de la force de l'homme et des qualités (tranquillité, élégance, etc.) de la femme.[10] Dans cette optique, Choisy, en se féminisant et en défaisant certains de ses traits masculins, se rapproche paradoxalement, du même coup, d'une forme de masculinité idéalisée. Ainsi, il conserve son identité genrée d'homme, dans le cadre du travestissement, et celui-ci en permet même un rapprochement.

La performance de l'identité féminine ne permet donc pas à l'abbé de se défaire de sa masculinité, la pratique du travestissement servant d'une affirmation inattendue de celle-là. En fait, cette notion de performance du genre n'est que la première facette du rapport entre la corporalité et la masculinité ; celle-ci est également une réalité physique vécue dont on ne peut se défaire par la performance. Le sexe de l'individu joue un rôle primal dans le déroulement de sa vie ; comme l'affirme théoricien du genre R.W. Connell, « true masculinity is almost always thought to proceed from men's bodies »,[11] le corps servant à orienter ou à limiter l'action de l'individu. Cette dimension du rapport est mise en jeu de façon particulière dans le forum sexuel, où a lieu le rapprochement avec l'Autre aimé. Pour Choisy, cette interaction est encore plus

4 Voir ibid., pages 296, 332, 337.
5 Voir ibid., page 324.
6 Voir ibid., page 303.
7 Voir ibid., page 300.
8 Voir ibid., page 291.
9 Voir Abigail Solomon-Godeau, « Male Trouble, » dans Constructing Masculinity, dirigé par Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis et Simon Watson, (Londres/New York: Routledge Inc., 1995), page 70.
10 Voir Chard, « Effeminacy, pleasure and the classical body, » page 145.
11 Connell, Masculinities, page 45.

charnière puisque sa capacité de vivre comme il le fait repose sur la complicité des filles qu'il poursuit (et donc sur leur ignorance de son identité anatomique).[12] Peu importe le point auquel sa performance de la féminité sera rigoureuse et convaincante, il demeure qu'il aura toujours son sexe à gérer. Dans cet organe repose à la fois sa force, sous la forme de son désir sexuel et de ses intentions de conquérant, et sa vulnérabilité, sous la forme d'un secret qu'il doit conserver précieusement afin d'atteindre ses buts. L'idée se résume bien dans un mot que Choisy adresse à Roselie, avouant que « [s]on secret, le repos de [s]a vie est entre [ses] mains [à Roselie] »[13] : l'identité masculine de Choisy est quelque chose d'inéluctablement tangible.

Si c'est dans les cadres personnel et amoureux que la nature corporelle de la masculinité est le plus évident, c'est dans celui d'une culture libertine masculine que la dimension sociale de ce que signifie être homme est le plus riche. Effectivement, le libertinage est « une activité éminemment masculine »,[14] en raison des normes limitant la possibilité des femmes de le pratiquer sans se nuire socialement. Comment, alors, la masculinité se constitue-t-elle dans ce contexte ? Les femmes n'en sont pas complètement exilées ; en fait, elles y demeurent centrales, étant l'objet des poursuites libertines des hommes. La sphère des interactions entre hommes se caractérise donc par la compétition pour les faveurs et l'intérêt de ces créatures. Cette compétition se consiste, entre autres, à affirmer sa masculinité et à dévaloir celle de ces rivaux, l'esprit compétitif de la guerre étant dès lors déplacée et mise en branle dans la sphère de la courtoisie et des apparences.[15] L'homme de cette époque doit donc se servir du côté corporel de sa masculinité, mais ce, en conjonction avec d'autres stratégies. La jalousie y joue un rôle important et c'est de ce genre de combat qu'il s'agit principalement entre les hommes dans les Mémoires ; l'abbé jouit du point auquel le marquis de Carbon[16] et le chevalier d'Hanecourt[17] sont verts de jalousie et déçus dans leurs tentatives de séduction, tandis que ses poursuites à lui sont couronnées de succès.

D'où vient ce succès ? Du fait que Choisy, dans le contexte de la compétition masculine pour les femmes, réussit à changer les modalités de cette même compétition, trouvant un moyen privilégié d'atteindre son

12 Voir Pierrick Brient, « Le désaveu du féminin chez l'abbé de Choisy, » Adolescence 3, issue 57 (2006) : 714.
13 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 353.
14 Michel Brix, « Stratégies amoureuses masculines : du libertinage des Lumières au pétrarquisme romantique, » dans Le mâle en France 1715-1830. Représentations de la masculinité : actes de colloque, dirigés par Katherine Astbury et Marie-Emmanuelle Plagnol-Diéval, (Berne : Peter Lang, 2004), page 179.
15 Voir Audrey Robin, Une sociologie du « beau "sexe fort" ». L'homme et les soins de beauté de hier à aujourd'hui (Paris : Éditions L'Harmattan, 2005), page 47.
16 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 321.
17 Voir ibid., page 348.

but. Pour une deuxième fois, alors, sa distanciation de la masculinité classique la maintient ; son travestissement constitue une « stratégie d'infiltration [de la] groupe qu'il s'agit de conquérir »[18] qui s'avère très efficace. De plus, vu l'idéal esthétique masculin qui a été traité ci-dessus (naissant à l'époque), les qualités féminines qu'il adopte attirent les femmes qu'il poursuit,[19] et il ne leur a pas été inculqué (aux femmes) de résister aux affections d'autres femmes. Ainsi, Choisy en femme est capable d'entrer où il n'aurait pas pu le faire en homme et d'agir plus librement que dans un contexte explicitement hétérosexuel ; comme Charlotte le lui explique après qu'ils se conviennent sur les conditions de leur relation amoureuse, « [elle] ne [s'est] point défendue [...] comme [elle aurait] fait avec un homme ».[20] De cette position privilégiée, Choisy peut alors mener le combat de son sexe, se servant des méthodes préférées dans cette culture masculine de poursuite amoureuse afin d'obtenir ce qu'il veut des femmes dont il s'est rapproché. Pour amener la femme à céder à sa volonté, il a donc recours à la manipulation, essayant de la faire culpabiliser, « la pressa[nt], [arguant que] elle [lui a] obligation et [qu'elle] vo[it] bien que [il] l'aim[e], [lui promettant] de ne l'abandonner jamais ».[21] Par de tels discours, Choisy fait avancer ses intérêts particuliers, mais révèle aussi, du même coup, les attentes qu'ont les hommes en général par rapport aux femmes. Ces attentes sont rendues plus explicites à un moment ultérieur, lorsqu'il offre ses avis à mademoiselle de la Grise avant le mariage de celle-ci, mettant l'accent sur ses devoirs de « [n]e songe[r] qu'à lui plaire [à son mari] », de s'occuper du ménage et d'élever les enfants.[22] De cette façon, on assiste aux manœuvres d'un homme qui, bien que pratiquant une masculinité peu conventionnelle, a assimilé les piliers de la culture masculine ambiante et qui mène la vie du libertin à merveille.

Cette culture libertine est une partie intégrale de la définition de la masculinité à cette époque parce que les hommes en ont quasiment le monopole ; « les aventures galantes ne sont pas des fautes pour les hommes »[23] et « la publicité fait la gloire des libertins »,[24] tandis que, pour les femmes, de telles aventures peuvent être accablantes. En vérité, il existe un réel double standard qui fait de la masculinité un avantage définitif dans plusieurs sphères de vie. Il y a donc, dans les

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18 Isabelle Billaud, « Masculin ou féminin ? La représentation du travesti et la question des savoirs au XVIIe siècle, » dans Savoirs et fins de la représentation sous l'Ancien Régime : actes des colloques jeunes chercheurs du Centre Interuniversitaire d'Étude sur la République des Lettres (CIERL), dirigés par le Centre Interuniversitaire d'Étude sur la République des Lettres, (Québec : Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2005), page 208.

19 Voir Chard, « Effeminacy, pleasure and the classical body, » page 157.

20 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 298.

21 ibid., page 353.

22 Voir ibid., pages 354-355.

23 Brix, « Stratégies amoureuses masculines : du libertinage des Lumières au pétrarquisme romantique, » page 180.

24 ibid., page 181.

Mémoires, une conscience aiguë que Choisy assume une position désavantageuse, conscience rendue explicite à quelques moments, comme lorsque Choisy lui-même remarque que « c'est une chose si rare de voir un homme souhaiter d'être femme »[25] ou que M. de Montausier reproche à Choisy son travestissement, lui demandant s'il n'avait « point de honte de porter un pareil habillement et de faire la femme, puisque [il était] assez heureux pour ne l'être pas ».[26] Ces commentaires rappellent le point auquel il est préférable d'être un homme à cette époque, mais aussi le fait que Choisy, même dans sa masculinité plutôt androgyne, jouit des privilèges de la gent masculine[27] ; sa déviance est connue ou soupçonnée par la plupart des gens, mais son argent et l'indulgence qu'on est enclin à accorder aux libertins le protègent. Il vaut mieux être un homme efféminé que d'être une femme. Cette position avantageuse correspond donc à la troisième (et dernière, dans le cadre de cet article) facette de la masculinité « classique » à laquelle le récit se conforme, la masculinité étant établie de façon claire comme une bénédiction et, par conséquent, le travestissement consistant, pour un homme, à aspirer à une condition définitivement en dessous de la sienne.[28]

Bien qu'ainsi, dans la considération de la corporalité, du libertinage et du double standard entre les hommes et les femmes, il y ait certains parallèles entre le portrait dressé de la masculinité dans les Mémoires et la notion de masculinité conçue et entretenue à l'époque, ce portrait n'est rien moins qu'univoque ; s'il y a concordance remarquable, il y a rupture tout aussi proéminente. D'abord, premier pilier remis en question, la notion de masculinité comme avantage. En fait, bien que les Mémoires admettent certains avantages de la masculinité, elles en soulignent aussi des inconvénients, cadrant la condition masculine comme une de supplices. Pour commencer, les modèles genrés et sexués proposés par la masculinité « classique », c'est-à-dire par les facteurs traités ci-dessus, peuvent être vécus comme opprimants.[29] C'est parce que le double standard va, en fait, des deux directions : ce qui est vertu chez la femme, tel que le goût des petits plaisirs, est condamné chez l'homme[30] comme perversion ou comme insuffisance. De plus, la masculinité étant une échelle contre laquelle on se mesure, l'homme qui se rapproche moins de l'idéal en est vivement conscient et prévoit la déception qu'autrui ressentira à son égard. Ainsi, Choisy prévient son lecteur qu'il ne s'agira pas, dans ses Mémoires, d'un récit politique ni d'une histoire guerrière.[31] Ces commentaires de Choisy sont symptom-

25 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 326.
26 ibid., page 294.
27 Voir Solomon-Godeau, « Male Trouble, » page 74.
28 Voir Billaud, « Masculin ou féminin ? La représentation du travesti et la question des savoirs au XVIIe siècle, » page 207.
29 Voir Solomon-Godeau, « Male Trouble, » page 73.
30 Voir Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 289.
31 Voir ibid., page 289.

atiques de son besoin, sachant qu'il n'est pas l'homme auquel on s'attend, de devancer la critique et de faire une brève apologie de soi avant d'entamer son récit. Les hommes ont certainement une plus grande liberté que les femmes ; cependant, être « homme » requiert un effort et un souci constants, et leur « sens de dignité », c'est-à-dire leur crainte de chuter dans la hiérarchie, les condamne souvent à ne pas expérimenter d'autres formes d'expression identitaire.[32]

Choisy ne cède pas à cette crainte, bien entendu ; il se travestit en femme et il est rare qu'il se fléchisse sous le poids des attentes sociales. Or, lorsqu'il arrive qu'il ploie sous le joug, et assume une identité plus explicitement et plus conformément masculine, il tombe nécessairement dans le jeu, vice par excellence des hommes.[33] Et puisqu'il ne connait pas de grands succès au jeu, il y perd ses moyens de reprendre son autre identité, faute de l'argent nécessaire pour se parer comme il en a l'habitude.[34] Ainsi, la masculinité semble porter un mécanisme qui condamne l'homme à la masculinité, puisque le jeu, activité privilégiée de ce sexe, lui vole la possibilité de choisir autrement. Heureusement pour Choisy, il réussit toujours, entre les chapitres, de retrouver son état de richesse, se permettant, ainsi, de continuer cette vie de va-et-vient, se balançant entre un travestissement déviant et le jeu, conforme, mais pernicieux.

L'homme choisissant de se conformer aux dictons de la masculinité classique prônant le jeu semble donc fortement désavantagé par rapport aux femmes et aux hommes choisissant de se comporter autrement. Les inconvénients de la masculinité ne se bornent pas, cependant, aux questions de la correspondance à l'idéal masculin, mais s'étendent aussi dans le domaine de la mission commune de tous les êtres humains, telle que développée par Choisy dans l'extrait suivant :

[L]e propre de Dieu est d'être aimé, adoré ; l'homme, autant que sa faiblesse le permet, ambitionne la même chose ; or, comme c'est la beauté qui fait naître l'amour, et qu'elle est ordinairement le partage des femmes, quand il arrive que des hommes ont ou croient avoir quelques traits de beauté qui peuvent les faire aimer ils tâchent de les augmenter par les ajustements des femmes, qui sont fort avantageux. Ils sentent alors le plaisir inexprimable d'être aimé.[35]

Selon ce raisonnement, les hommes seraient sur un pied d'inégalité par rapport aux femmes en ce qui concerne la recherche de l'amour, relativement moins capables de gagner l'amour et l'admiration d'aut-

32 Voir Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 325.
33 Voir ibid., page 322.
34 Voir ibid., page 319.
35 Voir ibid., page 292.

rui et donc moins capables de mener cette mission de l'humanité à sa fin. Effectivement, il s'agissait, à l'époque, d'une esthétique selon laquelle, même si les hommes plus efféminés étaient reconnus comme esthétiquement agréables, le sublime, et non le beau, demeurait leur partage unique.[36] Pour atteindre donc un niveau de beauté suffisant pour être véritablement aimé et adoré comme le sont les femmes, il faut employer les méthodes et les ajustements avantageux de celles-là. Sinon, les hommes seraient, selon la théorie de Choisy, condamnés à ne jamais se rapprocher de l'idéal divin, ce qui doit être le but de tout être humain, peu importe l'identité genrée ou sexuée.

Comment, dès lors, se libérer de ces supplices propres à la condition masculine ? La vie de Choisy en est un bon exemple, notamment parce qu'elle met en scène une vision de la masculinité qui la considère comme terme relative plutôt qu'absolue.[37] C'est par la comparaison à autrui que l'individu donne un sens à sa masculinité. Lorsque le comparant est un autre homme (ou d'autres hommes, au pluriel), on touche à la définition genrée de la masculinité, abordée brièvement ci-dessus dans le cadre de la compétition libertine pour la faveur des femmes. Selon cette définition, la masculinité serait une échelle qualitative différenciant les hommes entre eux[38] ; elle suppose un rôle primordial de l'Autre, en tant que miroir de l'individu, dans la constitution de l'identité masculine.[39] Choisy présente, ainsi, un certain sentiment implicite d'insuffisance par rapport à ses pairs masculins, notamment lorsqu'il y a rupture entre lui et Charlotte, les amis et parents de celle-ci lui ayant représenté « qu'un véritable mari lui donnerait bien d'autres plaisirs que [lui] qui ne faisai[t] que la caresser et la baiser ».[40] Ainsi, on constate, et Choisy ne conteste pas ce constat, qu'il n'est pas aussi homme qu'il pourrait l'être et que d'autres hommes le sont ; sa masculinité est moindre. Il s'agit donc, dans ce qui a trait à la masculinité, d'une question de degrés, où le rapprochement de la féminité, ou, autrement dit, le fait d'être plus similaire à l'idée de la femme qu'à celle de l'homme, subordonne cette masculinité aux autres, plus conformes à l'archétype.[41]

La féminité entre donc clairement dans la dimension comparative de la masculinité. Cependant, lorsque le comparant est féminin, il s'agit dès lors de la définition sémiotique[42] (ou sexuée) de la masculinité, selon laquelle la masculinité serait, fondamentalement, la nonféminité, un état se distinguant par un discours de différenciation[43] par rapport à

36 Voir Chard, « Effeminacy, pleasure and the classical body, » page 150.
37 Voir Connell, Masculinities, page 68.
38 Voir ibid., page 69.
39 Voir Mark Breitenberg, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England (Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 1996), page 164.
40 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 311.
41 Voir Connell, Masculinities, page 79.
42 Voir ibid., page 70.
43 Voir Breitenberg, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England, page 154.

la femme. Cette comparaison entre l'homme et la femme se fait explicitement à plusieurs moments, notamment lorsque Choisy énonce sa théorie de la mission des êtres humains sur Terre. Or, si ces moments sont parsemés tout à travers le texte, celui-ci est véritablement tissé de comparaisons de nature implicite ; en fait, on ne peut, dans les Mémoires, commenter un sexe sans commenter l'autre de façon sous-entendue. Ainsi, lorsque Choisy remarque que « [l]es femmes aiment qu'on suive leur avis »,[44] l'idée porte simultanément un constat sur la nature des femmes et une question de la nature des hommes ; si les femmes sont ainsi, comment les hommes sont-ils ? De cette façon, tout discours sur un sexe implique l'autre, ces catégories n'étant que des reflets de l'autre. Toute connaissance de l'un dit une connaissance de l'autre.

Le jeu entre une certaine conformité aux maximes d'une masculinité « classique » et une certaine remise en question des piliers et de la solidité de celle-là mène ainsi à la conclusion que la masculinité et l'idée qu'on en entretient relèvent non pas du domaine du nécessaire, mais de celui du possible. Le choix y est primal, plus que tout autre critère. En réalité, l'individu a la capacité d'exercer une influence sur son identité, de la prendre en main et de la manier. Il choisit sa manière d'être. Dans les Mémoires de Choisy, le travestissement ne constitue pas un simple changement d'habit, mais plutôt un choix d'une manière d'exister au monde. Pour le narrateur, le fait de se travestir implique une véritable transformation de soi ; il « [est] redevenu femme »,[45] il ne s'agit pas d'un masque qu'il revêtit,[46] mais plutôt d'une dimension de soi qui monte à la surface. Il ne feint pas cette identité, mais l'assume, ce qui paraît dans son choix (ou instinct) de mettre ses accords au féminin à plusieurs moments dans le récit. Or, il faut comprendre que le processus de constitution de l'identité est continu[47] ; il ne s'agit pas de choisir une fois et pour de bon entre deux options fixes, mais de choisir à chaque instant entre toutes les interprétations possibles des concepts multiples et variables que sont la masculinité et la féminité. Si à certains moments, Choisy semble s'identifier tout à fait comme femme à part entière, il énonce franchement à d'autres qu'il demeure un homme et s'identifie comme tel, même dans le cadre de sa vie travestie : il ne fait que « passer pour femme »,[48] « faire la belle »,[49] tout en sachant, comme il le formule explicitement avant de partir pour Bourges, qu'il « n'[est] pas une femme ».[50] Comment, alors, réconcilier des discours si contradictoires ? En fait, il ne faut qu'admettre que la masculinité et la

44 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 325.
45 ibid., page 290.
46 Voir ibid., page 291.
47 Voir Connell, Masculinities, page 63.
48 Voir ibid., page 303.
49 Voir ibid., page 319.
50 Voir ibid., page 332.

féminité peuvent échanger leurs places,[51] même au sein d'un individu, et que, en ce qui concerne l'identité, la réflexivité et l'agentivité de la personne priment sur tout autre facteur.

Étant donné ces modalités et ces grandes lignes définissant la réalité masculine dans les Mémoires de Choisy, ainsi que la marge de manœuvre par rapport à cette réalité dont l'individu peut se munir, Choisy a dès lors la chance de pouvoir façonner, à partir de ces facteurs multiples, des interprétations toutes particulières de la masculinité. En exigeant le travestissement de certaines de ses amantes, il forge des hommes idéaux à ses propres yeux et des couples qui, bien qu'ils soient peu conventionnels, obéissent à de stricts codes. On a vu, ci-dessus, que la masculinité et la féminité sont reliées étroitement et qu'elles peuvent coexister au sein d'une même personne. En fait, il faut aller un peu plus loin, et considérer ces catégories comme non seulement reliées, mais orthogonales.[52] Ainsi, comme s'il était situé dans un plan cartésien où un axe correspondrait à la masculinité et l'autre à la féminité, l'individu a, simultanément, un certain degré de masculinité et un certain degré de féminité (ce qui nuance l'explication précédente, de l'identité comme une succession de choix – en fait, il y une succession des simultanéités). Choisy crée des personnages, comme Charlotte, appelée M. de Maulny, et Roselie, qui vivent dans un entre-deux, conjugaisons vivantes de la masculinité et de la féminité. Or, ce qui importe pour Choisy, et ce qui constitue le premier des deux codes abordés dans cette dernière section, ce n'est pas l'identité isolée, mais l'identité face à l'Autre aimé, forum dans lequel un rapport binaire entre homme et femme doit régner. Si toute personne peut manifester la masculinité et la féminité dans sa relation à soi-même, les rôles sont répartis plus strictement entre les membres dans le cadre du couple ; un code hétérosexuel s'impose. Si Choisy s'habille en femme, il lui faut une femme habillée en homme, pour que le rapport binaire homme/femme se tienne et dans les genres performés et dans les anatomies cachées. Ainsi abondent dans les Mémoires des fantaisies de mariage et des travestissements mutuels. Les membres du couple doivent s'adapter à l'identité de leur partenaire, pour maintenir l'équilibre ; Choisy insiste pour que Dany l'appelle « mon petit mari » ou « ma petite femme » et il s'ajustera selon sa préférence.[53] De cette dualité fondamentale naissent le contentement et le plaisir des amants, qui s'épanouissent dans un cadre hétérosexuel, mais qui ont en même temps la chance de vivre la complexité de leur identité genrée. Car s'il s'agit inéluctablement, chez Choisy, de relations entre un homme et une femme, le détenteur de ces titres change constamment.

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51 Voir Solomon-Godeau, « Male Trouble, » page 73.

52 Voir Eve Kosofsky-Sedgwick, « "Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in Your Masculinity!" » dans Constructing Masculinity, dirigé par Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis et Simon Watson, (Londres/New York: Routledge Inc., 1995), page 15.

53 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 316.

Quel est donc le propre de l'homme, si chaque élément qui pourrait le définir amène nécessairement vers le constat d'une ambiguïté catégorique ? Le mot « homme » serait-il complètement contingent, absurde, vide de sens ? Non ; tout au long de ses Mémoires, Choisy énonce un projet, un mandat, un code, propre aux hommes. Il se peut que la différence entre les sexes soit surestimée et que les catégories genrées soient accessibles à tous ; néanmoins, la société s'organise selon des suppositions contraires. Les hommes doivent donc, dès lors, faire ce qu'ils peuvent pour leurs amantes, qui sont aussi accablées, dans certains cas plus, qu'eux par les définitions strictes de la masculinité et de la féminité. Selon les dictons de la culture libertine masculine ambiante, la « vanité [des hommes] consiste à séduire les femmes et à les abandonner »[54] et les femmes, dès qu'on rompt avec elles, ne connaissent « ni générosité, ni reconnaissance, ni même pitié ».[55] Choisy se fait de lui-même le contre-exemple de ces pratiques. Il n'abandonne une maîtresse sans l'avoir vue bien établie préalablement, arrangeant des unions matrimoniales lui-même, payant des dots, donnant des conseils et faisant des cadeaux. De plus, il se montre capable de penser d'abord à l'être aimé lors de la grossesse de Roselie, événement qui le pousse à abandonner le travestissement de manière temporaire afin d'être l'homme dont la femme a besoin, faisant venir des sages-femmes et n'ayant comme souci que le confort de cet être. Ainsi, Choisy lance implicitement un défi aux autres hommes : celui de bien traiter les femmes et de les aimer plus justement (reste qu'il s'agit toujours d'un libertin, mais il fait que son libertinage est aussi inoffensif que possible).

Ce code qu'il s'impose à lui-même permet donc de compléter la vue d'ensemble de la masculinité qu'on tente d'esquisser depuis le début de cet article. Si la question de ce qu'est l'homme demeure largement sans réponse satisfaisante, la masculinité se définissant de façons multiples, contradictoires et ambiguës, il y a du moins une définition normative, [56]de ce que doit être l'homme, qui se dégage à la suite d'une microlecture de ces Mémoires à la lumière des théories de genre telles que connues aujourd'hui. Par moyen du point de vue unique que son travestissement lui confère, Choisy parvient à étaler plusieurs niveaux et plusieurs interprétations de la masculinité comme notion sexuée, genrée, sociale, individuelle, relationnelle et autres. Et à travers ces réflexions implicites, ces études de cas non commentées, ces récits hors du commun, se tisse un grand projet ; si Choisy se vante souvent de son amour-propre, qui oriente sa vie, il réussit tout de même à promouvoir, en fin de compte, l'empathie. Ses Mémoires brouillant les frontières entre tant de catégories jusqu'alors vues comme essentielles à la constitution de l'identité et remettant en question les catégories mêmes,

54 Choisy, « Mémoires de l'abbé de Choisy habillé en femme, » page 316.
55 ibid., page 185.
56 Voir Connell, Masculinities, page 70.

elles soulignent la multiplicité de facteurs avec lesquels chacun doit lutter. Dans un tel bouleversement, où tous se trouvent confondus et embrouillés, nul mandat universel ne peut tenir, sauf celui que propose Choisy : celui de ne pas nuire.

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Death of the Author or Death of the Artist?

Zoë Poole

In The Death of the Author, Roland Barthes argues that the interpretation of literature depends on the reader since the meaning of a text is within the language of the text itself. As Barthes' theory develops from a claim about how language works linguistically, it cannot apply to non-linguistic art forms and is thus insufficient as a theory of interpretation of art. To overcome this linguistic constraint I propose to define language functionally, using Barthes' own notion of the function of words, as that which posits meaning empty outside of the act of position. I demonstrate how this alternate definition of language might apply to other art forms and hence how this modification of Barthes' theory allows it to apply to the interpretation of all art as opposed to just literature.

In The Death of the Author, Roland Barthes criticizes the practice of incorporating an author's intention and identity into the interpretation of a text. Barthes argues that the meaning of a text is within the language of the text itself: "it is language which speaks, not the author"[1]. He concludes that interpretation of a text depends not on the author but on the impression of language upon the reader in the moment in it is read[2]. From this, the question can be raised as to whether, if author and artist are equated, Barthes' theory holds true for other mediums of art. I shall proceed to answer this question, beginning with a more detailed explanation of Barthes' theory.

Barthes' theory develops from a distinction between the author the person and the author the subject. He writes: "linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is never more than the instance saying I"[3]. While the personal author is the person who wrote the text, the authorial subject of language is the voice situated in the particular instance of writing, and therefore impersonal. However, it is the subject of language, not the personal author, which enunciates in writing. Hence language itself performs the actual act of enuncia-

1 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Continental Aesthetics: Romanticism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, ed. Richard Kearney & David Rasmussen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 371.
2 Ibid., 372.
3 Ibid.

tion. As Barthes writes: "the subject of language is empty outside of the enunciation which defines it"[4]. Being language, the "author" the subject does not exist prior to a text but comes into existence simultaneously with it and only exists in the act of enunciation[5].

Barthes links writing to the linguistic concept of a performative, a verbal form in which enunciation is empty of any content other than the act by which it is uttered, such as the phrase I declare[6]. Writing is like a performative in that it is an enunciation by a subject that does not exist outside of it, positing words with "no other origin than language itself" since language itself enunciates[7]. Moreover, language "ceaselessly calls into question all origins" since words are only explainable through other words[8]. Since words are posited by language itself with meaning that is intrinsically linguistic, viz. of words, the meaning of a text can have no origin other than within its language. Hence the meaning of literature must be within the work itself, independent of the author's identity and intention.

On first glance, it appears that Barthes' theory is explicitly unique to literature and will not hold for other mediums of art. This is because it derives from a claim about how writing works linguistically: specifically, the claim that words and their meanings have no origin except language itself. From this claim it follows that the meaning posited by language is empty outside of language itself, and hence that the meaning of literature is contained within the language of the text. In its current form, Barthes' theory cannot apply to other mediums of art: art is not necessarily linguistic, at least not in the traditional verbal sense. For example, classical music is often word-less. If a theory needs to apply to all mediums of art homogeneously to be a theory of the interpretation of art, then his theory as it is is insufficient.

I propose that if the concept of language is loosened to something that is not purely linguistic, then Barthes' theory could apply to other mediums of art. We typically equate language with linguistics, or to be more precise, spoken or written words. However, there are non wordbased languages common to our everyday experience: for example, body language. Unlike verbal language, body language does not use pre-determined signs to represent a specific meaning. Nevertheless, both types of language are used to communicate or express meaning. Hence I propose to define language not linguistically or by essence, but by its function. While language happens to function linguistically in the case of literature, it is not essentially linguistic: anything can be a language in-

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 373.

sofar as it fulfills the same role that language does in speech or writing. This role I shall define after looking at Barthes' theory more closely.

Recall: Barthes' theory develops from the claim that words posit and possess meaning that is empty outside of the act of enunciation, a claim which construes language linguistically. This is primarily a functional claim: it is of what words do, viz. how they posit meaning empty outside of the act of enunciation, not of what they are, viz. an arrangement of letters or sounds. Thus it is the function of words which Barthes' theory is actually built on. I propose to define language loosely by this function. Specifically, I propose to define language as that which fulfills the role of positing meaning where this meaning is contained within the act of positing itself. On this view, anything which acts as language has meaning only within itself: all meaningful gestures, actions, words, etc. are performatives.

If there is something which functions as a language for other mediums of art, then Barthes' theory of interpretation can be applied and the artist's intentions and identity deemed irrelevant to interpretation of a work. There are two conditions to consider: (i) whether there can exist something constituting language in other forms of art, and (ii) whether this thing is a language as defined. In answer to (i), just as words form language for literature it can be said that sounds (including properties of pitch, length, instrument, etc) form a language for music; visuals (including properties of colour, space, texture, etc) form a language for visual art; movements (including properties of speed, duration, body parts, etc) form a language for dance; and so on. I see no reason why these "languages" should not plausibly be taken to exist for any medium of art.

Condition (ii) is more complex. It requires that the constituents of a language—sounds, visuals, movements, and so on—act like performatives in that they posit meaning that exists only within the act itself. It seems plausible that music functions this way with sound. Music enunciates sound, and the meaning of sound originates in the music itself: a sound can only be defined relative to other sounds, and any verbal expression of its meaning is a translation of a meaning that must exist in the sound prior to such expression. Moreover, sounds take on different meanings within different songs: for example, the same three consecutive notes on a piano can mean different things depending on whether they constitute a build-up versus a fall in a particular song. Hence the meaning of music can be considered to be within the sounds of that particular music itself.

Dance can be conceived of in similar fashion. While a dancer might choose a movement to convey a particular meaning, the actual meaning

it conveys does not exist independent and prior to the act. Rather, the meaning of the act presupposes the existence of the act itself: the dancer cannot convey an intended meaning through a specific movement unless the movement itself exists. Being dependent on the act's existence, the meaning conveyed by the movement depends both on its particulars, such as its speed or duration, and its situation, such as what movements precede or follow it. In this sense movement, like music or literature, is intransitive: instead of being a sign for some particular feature, its meaning belongs to the movement itself. I see no reason why the same argument cannot apply to visuals or any other constituent of language.

Conditions (i) and (ii) satisfied, it can now be said that while Barthes' theory is explicitly unique to literature in that it derives from a linguistic claim, a modification of his theory that defines language functionally using Barthes' own notion of words escapes the linguistic constraint and thus allows his theory in its skeletal form to apply to other mediums of art. The constituents of an artwork—be it words, sound, visuals, movements, etc—exist for the purpose of communication a meaning that is essentially contained in the act, and therefore within the art itself. In this sense art is not a vehicle for communicating an external meaning but a meaning itself.

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Organs and Obligations: A Response to John Harris's "The Survival Lottery"

James Lawrence

In "The Survival Lottery", John Harris offers a disturbing solution to the problem of donated organ shortage, one which challenges our strongest and most basic moral intuitions. Harris proposes that, in the event of an organ shortage, the organs of a random person be harvested to save the lives of two or more patients with failing organs. Harris argues that this lottery is morally permissible by way of a rejection of any morally significant distinction between killing and letting die; a rejection which this paper takes issue with. This paper argues that it is morally permissible for an agent to let someone die by abstaining from action. This paper also draws from Fiona Woollard's account of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing Harm to argue that we ought to maintain a moral distinction between killing and letting if bodily integrity is to be respected.

John Harris's "The Survival Lottery" paints a picture of a dystopian world that seems more appropriate for science fiction than moral philosophy. It begins with a thought experiment: in a world where "organ transplant procedures have been perfected"[1] two dying patients, Y and Z, make the case that if their doctor were to kill one third party person, A, they could harvest A's organs and prevent their deaths. They argue that A is no more innocent than they and therefore has no greater claim to life, and that it would be entirely unjust if they were to die simply because they are unlucky to have diseased organs.[2] The doctor claims that it is morally impermissible to kill A, and that she is not unjust in letting Y and Z die; to which Y and Z respond that while killing is prima facie wrong, and the killing of A surely regrettable, the doctor "ought on balance to kill one man if two can thereby be saved."[3] Y and Z then propose a scheme wherein every human is given a number so that, in the absence of donated organs, a medical professional can request a num-

1 Harris, John, "The Survival Lottery." Philosophy 50 (1975): 81.
2 Ibid., 81-82.
3 Ibid., 82.

ber (generated at random by a computer) that corresponds to a donor to be killed to save the lives of two ore more people.[4] This "lottery" would ultimately, Harris argues, accord with utilitarian principles, solve the issue of donated organ shortage, and dramatically reduce the number of deaths annually.

It is my intuition, as it may be yours, that an organ lottery like Harris's is morally objectionable. This paper seeks to defend that intuition and reject Harris's lottery on the basis of the morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Interestingly, when considering the objection of a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die, Harris deflects. He claims that the purported distinction begs the question "as to whether the failure to save as many people as possible might not also amount to killing."[5] Writes Harris, "if a doctor refuses to treat a patient, with the result that the patient dies, he has killed that patient sure as shooting, and that, in exactly the same way, if the doctors refuse Y and Z the transplants that they need, then their refusal will kill Y an Z, again as sure as shooting."[6] I claim that by refusing to give Y and Z A's organs the doctor is not killing them, she is letting them die, and that this should be considered morally permissible. To argue this, I will draw on Fiona Wollard's account of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing Harm to argue that (1) the doctor's decision to let Y and Z die is morally permissible, and that (2) we must defend the moral distinction between killing and letting die if we believe people have a right to their own bodies.

Woollard's key question through which she explores the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing harm "is whether or not the relevant fact about the agent's behavior is part of the sequence leading to harm."[7] By sequence Woollard is referring to "a set of facts . . . that lead to/are relevant to/cause outcomes."[8] She does this by distinguishing relevant facts as either substantial or non-substantial. Woollard defines substantial facts as facts that "tell us something about some change or addition to the world"[9]; they are the "real causes"[10] of the sequence leading to harm. Non-substantial facts are, by definition, not substantial: these constitute "mere conditions" for the sequence.[11]

Woollard illustrates this distinction using the example of Bob, who is bitten by a snake and must rush to the hospital, and Victor, who is on an

4 Ibid., 83.
5 Ibid., 84.
6 Ibid., 82.
7 Woollard, Fiona, Doing and Allowing Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015. 23.
8 Ibid., 24.
9 Ibid., 29.
10 Ibid., 26.
11 Ibid., 29.

adjacent slope of a boulder that is blocking Bob's path.[12] In the "Push" scenario, Bob pushes the boulder to clear the path, which causes the boulder to roll and hit Victor. In "Non-interpose", a mysterious force has sent the boulder rolling towards Victor whilst Bob is driving along. Bob can save Victor by driving into the boulder, but he decides not to because he needs to get to the hospital. So, the boulder continues along and crushes Victor. Woollard argues that in "Push" the fact that Bob pushes the boulder is a substantial fact in the sequence because he is changing the world, and is therefore causally relevant to the upshot of Victors death; in this case Bob can be said to be doing harm.[13] Woollard considers the fact that Bob does not drive into the boulder in "Non-interpose" to be a non-substantial fact because it simply tells us "that something that could have been there is not there"[14]; it is a fact of absence, and therefore not casually related to Victor's death. In "Non-Interpose" Bob allows harm.

The "Push" and "Non-Interpose" thought experiments map beautifully on to the disagreement between Y, Z, and the doctor, which is why I have taken pains to elaborate them. By refusing Y and Z A's organs, the doctor acts like Bob in "Non-Interpose": the upshot of Y and Z's death due to organ failure has been set in motion by misfortune, much like the boulder, and by not intervening to stop their deaths the doctor is acting like Bob who decides not to drive his car into the boulder. The relevant fact of the doctor and Bob's behavior are both non-substantial because they are non-actions, refusals to do something. It is therefore a mere condition for the deaths of Y and Z; thus the doctor is letting them die, not killing them. This does not mean that the doctor's refusal to give Y and Z the organs is not relevant to their deaths. Her refusal does indeed ensure their deaths, but it does not mean that it is part of the sequence as Woollard defines it, and it does not mean she is killing them. The relevant fact of the doctor's refusal is a "non-causal consequence" in that the agent's behavior brings about state of affairs, but is not causally connected to the upshot: Y and Z are indeed in danger but "the danger of the victims is not caused by the agent's behavior."[15] The doctor is not killing Y and Z, but letting them die.

Demonstrating that the doctor would be letting Y and Z die by refusing them treatment is the easy part. What is more difficult is showing why this is morally relevant. I agree with Woollard that the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing Harm is needed "if morality is to recognize anything as genuinely belonging to a person."[16] The doctrine advances constraints against doing harm; constraints which serve to recognize that

12 Ibid., 21.
13 Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm, 21.
14 Ibid., 29.
15 Ibid., 27.
16 Ibid., 97.

an agent's body and mind belong to her.[17] Without these constraints our bodies are common property: they "may be damaged whenever this is necessary to prevent greater harm occurring to others."[18] This hits the nail on the head.

For we should not forget that A's organ's belong to A, and that A has a right to what belongs to him. Nor should we forget that A has a right to his own body. If the lottery were enacted, or if A were to be killed, both of these rights would be violated.

It also cannot be true that Y and Z can be said to have a right to A's organs on the basis of utility, nor that the doctor is going against his duty by allowing Y and Z to die. The doctrine defends this claim by allowing harm on the basis of protecting against normative imposition, defined as the "needs of another person intrud [ing] into the agent's sphere."[19] Woollard claims that while we have some obligation to aid others, this does not mean that we have to put our safety and resources completely at their disposal.[20] She points to two dimensions upon which we can judge whether or not we are morally required to aid: severity and frequency.[21] In respect to A, the severity of what he is required to sacrifice—his life—is tremendous; such that A cannot reasonably be said to be acting wrongly if he refuses. The doctor, meanwhile, would be required to kill people often and without end. As we can see, A and the doctor are normatively imposed upon to preform actions that are quite literally a matter of life and death. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing Harm protects against normative imposition by allowing harm: by permitting Y and Z to die, the doctor and A's rights are not violated.

Henceforth, this paper has shown why it is not the case that the doctor kills Y and Z by refusing to kill A, but rather that she is letting them die. It has argued that this distinction can be demonstrated and is of fundamental importance if we take seriously the belief that people have an inviolable right to their own bodies. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing Harm needs to be defended so as to understand what actions are morally impermissible, but even more so to ensure that our bodies and resources are not imposed upon: to protect what belongs to us. The doctor is imposed upon by Y and Z by their request to kill A, and A is imposed upon to give up his organs and his life. It cannot be said that the doctor and A are acting wrongly by not performing the organ transplant. They are allowed to let Y and Z die.

Harris may object that I am splitting hairs about killing and letting die;

17 Ibid., 106.
18 Ibid., 106.
19 Ibid., 109.
20 Ibid., 123.
21 Ibid., 124.

that who dies and how is besides the point. All he argues is that the doctor has an obligation to keep Y and Z alive by all means necessary and that Y and Z's right to life is as strong as A's right not to be killed. This I think is a slippery slope. If we do not hold body integrity as a fundamental right, if we permit other rights to trump it, then we enter a moral grey zone. Who's to say a man charged with sexual assault might not argue that his right to self-determination surmounts a woman's right to her body. No, the right to one's body should be incontrovertible and protected above all others. Harris could also object that we lack imagination, that if we saw the benefits of such a world we would all gladly waive the right to our bodies. To this I have no immediate objection. I would request only that if one decided to opt out of the lottery, to reassert their right to their body, that their wish be respected.

In sum, Harris's argument that the doctor kills Y and Z by not killing A and using A's organs to save them is incorrect according to Woollard's account of doing and allowing harm. Rather, the doctor is letting Y and Z die, which Woollard and I claim is morally permissible. We need to defend this distinction and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to ensure that people are not imposed upon by others and that the inviolable right to one's body is protected. Ultimately, Harris must do significantly more work to justify his lottery, to reconcile his proposal to use a person's body without their consent; to use it as a means, not an end.

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Incontinence & the Roles of Desire, Decision & Prudence in Aristotle's Ethics

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The purpose of this work will be to identify the significance of rational and sentient desires in Aristotle's moral framework as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics. Particular attention will be paid to the roles of each of these respective desire in incontinence. I will then transition to a discussion of the roles of decision, deliberation and prudence with respect to both Aristotle's greater moral framework as well as the case of incontinence. After each section of the paper, I will provide a brief discussion regarding what I believe to be the important conclusions to take away from Aristotle's body of moral beliefs and how they might be applied within to our own behaviour.

According to Aristotle's metaphysical framework, the human soul is composed of three distinct parts: the nutritive life, the sentient life and the rational life.[1] The latter two categories are of particular importance to Aristotle in discussions concerning moral action. In the following, I will outline the importance of both rational and sentient desires in the moral framework of Aristotle, by paying particular attention to their relevance in the case of incontinence. I will then follow-up by examining the roles of decision, deliberation and prudence in Aristotle's moral framework as a whole, and again as they correspond to the particular case of incontinence. For both sections, I will include a brief comment directly after, providing further investigation into a point of Aristotle's that I find to be of particular importance.

The rational life is concerned with acting in accordance with reason and attaining theoretical wisdom.[2] It is the only part of the soul which

1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 1098a1-8, 1102a30, 1102b30.
2 Ibid., 1098a1-8.

humans alone posses and thus it differentiates us from animals and plants alike.[3] Insofar as it is the basis of our distinction, Aristotle takes the function of the rational part of the soul to be the function of the human as a whole.[4] Thus, insofar as goodness consists in the excellence of a function in attaining its end, goodness for the human being must be excellence in exercising our rational capacities to attain the end of happiness.[5] Thus, our rational desire is to realize the end of goodness or happiness[6] through the proper functioning of our rational capacities. I will be focusing on the part of the rational life that is concerned with practical guidance due to its relevance to the topic of ethics. It's core functions consist of deliberation and decision[7] and its desire is to guide actions such that they accord with reason and virtue and realize an end of happiness.[8] Thus, its importance to the notion of moral action consists in its role as the means by which we are able to evaluate a given action's accordance with reason and virtue. As such, it tends to interact with the sentient life, and can often come into conflict with it.[9] The rational desire to act in accordance with reason attempts to guide the passions and desires for pleasure of the sentient life and it is thus highly important for Aristotle to examine both lives in studying moral action. Success in the realm of morality then, is dependent on the extent to which the rational desires are able to exert a meaningful effect on the sentient desires.[10] However, despite the benefits of having the rational control the sentient life to some extent, complete control by the rational life is not ideal. Pleasure (Aristotle's concern is particularly with bodily pleasures) can be good and ought to be enjoyed insofar as it accords with virtuous action[11] and thus rather than curb sentient desires entirely it is the duty of the rational life to balance them and refrain from enjoying them to excess.[12] In fact, to completely abstain from pleasure is also considered to be vicious as it and ought to be avoided to the same extent.[13] It is the duty of the rational life and its desires to maintain the correct mean between excess and deficiency.[14]

The sentient part of the body is concerned with sensations, desires and passions.[15] It abides to some extent by a pleasure principle and is one of the two lives that we share with animals alike (the other being the nutri-

3 Ibid., 1098a4.
4 Ibid., 1098a7.
5 Ibid., 1097b25, 1098a14.
6 Giles Pearson, Aristotle on Desire (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012), 140.
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b12.
8 Ibid., 1140a29.
9 Ibid., 1102b17.
10 Ibid., 1102b29.
11 Ibid., 1105a15.
12 Ibid., 1119a9, 20.
13 Ibid., 1119a9.
14 Ibid., 1107a1-3.
15 Ibid., 1102b31.

tive).[16] It is an extremely important aspect of the individual that ought to be taken into consideration when discussing moral action. Pleasure is a very powerful experience and thus according to Aristotle it can have both positive and negative consequences.[17] Pleasure is to some extent good in itself, and ought to be enjoyed for its positive value, however the source of its value according to Aristotle is to add to the goodness of already virtuous activity. To derive pleasure from performing virtuous actions increases the goodness of such an activity. Conversely, to take pleasure from engaging in vicious activity adds to the viciousness of such an activity.[18] Thus, pleasure is not to be sought indiscriminately for Aristotle. It is important to note the source of the pleasure, and according to Aristotle pleasure is most valuable when it contributes to our enjoyment of virtuous activities. However, the sentient desire for pleasure can be corrupting if it is pursued as an end in and of itself.[19] When pleasure is pursued to excess it can be damaging to the body and individual. Furthermore, insofar as the virtues of character maintain some sort of unity and bear a relationship to one another,[20] the pursuit of pleasure at all costs will begin to affect other aspects of such an individual's life. It is for such a reason that Aristotle believes the sentient desires must be watched over by our rational capacities.[21]

The roles of rational desire and sentient desire in terms of moral action are demonstrated most clearly by the example of incontinence. Incontinence is a character trait that exists on a continuum between temperance, a virtue of character,[22] and intemperance, a vice. Incontinence consists of the character trait wherein an individual is able to recognize the pull of reason against enjoying pleasures to excess, but nevertheless eventually tends to succumb to the pull of sentient desires and the pursuit and pleasure.[23] Incontinence stands in opposition to temperance, wherein reason and the sentient desires are in complete accordance,[24] [25]continence, where in ultimately reason is pursued despite some clashing between reason and the pull of sentient desires,[26] and intemperance, wherein one succumbs entirely to the sentient desires.[27] Incontinence demonstrates a direct conflict between the rational de-

16 Ibid., 1098a1.
17 Ibid., 1105a15.
18 Ibid., 1105a15.
19 Ibid., 1119a1.
20 Elizabeth Telfer, "The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1989): 35.
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1102b35.
22 Ibid., 1103a7.
23 Ibid., 1145b13.
24 Ibid., 1109a10-15, 1119b17.
25 James Jerome Walsh, Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (New York: Columbia UP, 1963), 92.
26 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b9-15.
27 Ibid., 1119a1.

sires and the sentient desires.[28] The rational desire attempts to curb the sentient desires by guiding the individual away from indulging in all pleasures to excess and instead enjoying pleasure with reason.[29] It recognizes that damage that can be caused by pursuing pleasure to excess and deems it to be an irrational course of action. Furthermore, the rational life attempts to guide the individual toward virtuous action, such that pleasure might be derived from such actions. In contrast, the sentient desires attempt to pursue pleasure at all costs and to an infinite excess. It does not consider the harm that might be inflicted unto itself by such a course of action, and seeks only to satisfy its desires. The incontinent individual recognizes this clash between desires, insofar as they recognize are able to correctly reason that the absolute pursuit of pleasure to excess is contrary to reason/morality and harmful to the individual and thus ought no to be undertaken.[30] However, the pull of reason is not strong enough for the incontinent individual and while they recognize the value of reason and the viciousness of pursuing pleasure at all costs, they routinely succumb to such pleasures.[31]

It would seem as though Aristotle has identified a genuine source of conflict within the individual, and his categories of continence and incontinence seem to accurately describe a vast majority of the population. We do not often see completely temperate or intemperate people, however it seems accurate to say that much of the world can be divided into those who recognize the pull of the sentient life but ultimately follow reason and those who are capable of recognizing reason but who nevertheless are unable to escape the pull of the sentient desires. Furthermore, in developing the notion of temperance, Aristotle provides a positive normative goal for society, that offers what I believe to be a vital piece of insight in trying to develop at virtuous character: it is not that we must diminish entirely the role of the sentient life and our sentient desires such that rationality would posses a tyrannical reign over the body, but rather, we must attempt to shape and guide our sentient desires using practical wisdom to achieve a temperate disposition. Temperance is not abstention from pleasure but rather pleasure in accordance with reason,[32] and I believe this is a highly important aspect of Aristotle's theory to note for those attempting to develop virtuous dispositions.

In addition to the notions of rational and sentient desire, it is important to examine the notions of decision, deliberation and prudence or practical wisdom in Aristotle's ethical framework, for they provide the principle of action and the guidance under which we act. Decision is

28 Ibid., 1102b15-20.
29 Ibid., 1109a10-15, 1119b17.
30 James Jerome Walsh, Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness, 104.
31 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b13.
32 Ibid., 1109a9-15.

the act of willfulness that makes concrete our deliberations.[33] On the basis of deliberation, we make some sort of decision, constituting the first step in realizing the decision's consequent action. It is distinct from wish and belief, for the former are concerned with potentially impossible events,[34] and the latter are propositions that are evaluated in terms of their truth-value and not their normative value.[35] Deliberation is the means by which we are able to determine the intermediate steps that ought to be taken in order to realize a given end.[36] It is the precursor to decision and exists only in abstract until made concrete by decision.[37] It is thus the active component of the rational life, used to plan and determine our actions.[38] Prudence is also known as practical wisdom. It is a virtue of thought for the rational life[39] and is primarily concerned with action guidance.[40] In particular, prudence concerned with informing our deliberations and decisions so that we may make decisions that accord with reason.[41] As a function of the rational part of the soul it attempts to determine what actions one ought to perform such that they accord with virtue, reason and goodness, and informs us of what ends ought to be achieved in order to realize the total end of happiness.[42] It is thus the basis of all virtuous action and constitutes a fundamental concept in Aristotle's understanding of morality.[43]

What differentiates incontinence from continence is precisely the presence and efficaciousness of an individual's practical wisdom. According to Aristotle, goodness is a function of prudence.[44] Practical wisdom informs the deliberation of the continent individual and directs the deliberation towards the correct end, namely happiness or eudaimonia.[45] Practical wisdom is then able to control the sentient desires and direct them into accordance with reason so that such an end may be realized in the most practical way. This accordance is then realized when the continent individual deliberates on how to act to achieve such an end and then forms a decision on the basis of such deliberation.

However, the incontinent individual lacks the practical wisdom necessary to overcome the pull of the sentient desires (McDowell 61)[46].

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33 Ibid., 1113a10.
34 Ibid., 1111b20-25.
35 Ibid., 1111b32.
36 Ibid., 1112b13,17.
37 Ibid., 1111b20-25.
38 John McDowell, The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2009), 42.
39 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a7.
40 Ibid., 1140a29, 1140b5.
41 Ibid., 1141b10.
42 Ibid., 1141b13.
43 Ibid., 1144b32, 1145a1.
44 Ibid., 1144b32.
45 Ibid., 1142b35.
46 John McDowell, The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, 61.

The rational guidance of prudence does not exert a sufficient effect to outweigh the strength of the sentient desires and thus the latter are eventually pursued. Nevertheless, the incontinent individual possesses enough practical wisdom to recognize the error of his or her ways. Thus, it seems as though in acting irrationally and uninformed by practical wisdom, the incontinent individual does not in fact deliberate or decide on their actions but rather acts on the basis of appetite (Aristotle 1111b15)[47]. As a result, all consequent actions will be directed toward pleasure as an end. Thus it would seem as if practical wisdom (McDowell 61)[48] and engaging in deliberation/decision-making are key factors for Aristotle that are able to form the distinction between the continent and incontinent individual. It is on the basis of practical wisdom that the individual deliberates/decides, rather than merely succumbing to appetites. However, practical wisdom ought to be understood in terms of how it functions to inform the decision-making and deliberation of the individual for these are the fundamental principles of action for the rational life.

In my opinion, what is extremely important to note about the role of practical wisdom in the decision-making and deliberation of the incontinent person is that the means by which an individual might shed his or her incontinence is through the exercising of practical wisdom. Of interest is the fact that Aristotle believes practical wisdom ought to be learned from the practically wise,[49] just as an individual aspiring to learn a craft ought to learn from craftsmen. This places particular importance on the role of education and the setting of examples in Aristotle's moral framework[50] and I believe this ought to be emphasized more in our present society. It seems Aristotle has struck a particularly salient aspect of our understanding of moral action and we ought to recognize the importance of learning from our superiors and developing a sufficient education in the field of morality and action. On the basis of such an education, children will be capable of honing their practical wisdom as they grow, such that they will eventually be capable of making rationally informed moral decisions through their own capacities.

In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that the desires of the sentient and rational lives form the very basis of how we ought to understand moral action and in particular the virtues of character. The rational desire to accord with reason is the means by which we are motivated to guide our actions towards a good end and as such forms the basis of our moral sensibilities. However, the pleasure sought by the sentient life is a necessary component of our lives and is instrumental in our en-

47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b15.
48 John McDowell, The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, 61.
49 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a25.
50 Ibid., 1104b10.

joyment of virtuous activities. Because each life desires distinct ends, they commonly come into conflict with one another and it is generally the role of the rational life to keep control over the sentient desires. However, sometimes the conflict is too strong and an individual succumbs to the pull of the sentient desires rather than following the guidance of reason and this is most overtly demonstrated in the case of the incontinent individual. Decision, deliberation and prudence also come in to play for Aristotle's understanding of moral action, for the latter is capable of informing the former two functions and is the means by which an individual can trend away from incontinence/intemperance and towards continence and ultimately temperance. Further investigations into Aristotle's works concerning ethics and moral action might focus on determining the roles of the rational and sentient desires in the manifestation of other dispositions of character.

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The Theory of Compulsory Heterosexuality

Hosanna Galea

An exposition and critical evaluation of Rich's theory

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This paper is, in part, an expository piece as well as a critical evaluation of Adrienne Rich's theory of compulsory heterosexuality. I sought to delve into explaining her theory on a deeper level by explicating a select passage from her work in which I believe her ideas to be most clearly put forth. The examination of her theory allows for illumination of the omnipresent heterosexual forces that govern women's lives. I argue that compulsory heterosexuality is a form of political institution that controls and oppresses women. Ultimately, I argue that this theory has some limitations for many heterosexual women, yet is worth being understood and considered an insightful tool for feminist discourses. Freedom and Bad Faith

"Whatever its origins, when we look hard and clearly at the extent and elaboration of measures designed to keep women within a male sexual purlieu, it becomes an inescapable question whether the issue we have to address as feminists is, not simple 'gender inequality,' nor the domination of culture by males, nor mere 'taboos against homosexuality,' but the enforcement of heterosexuality for women as a means of assuring male right of physical, economical, and emotional access"

Adrienne Rich, « Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Continuum, » 647.

Adrienne Rich's theory of compulsory heterosexuality asserts that there is an overarching source of power generated by patriarchal society that manifests itself in the "enforcement" of women into heterosexual tendencies and behaviors in order to be available and subject to men. In her work, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Continuum, Rich discusses compulsory heterosexuality as the political and social

means of controlling and regulating women that forces them into normalized heterosexuality and ignores woman-to-woman relationships—which Rich labels the "lesbian continuum". I will discuss the way in which compulsory heterosexuality can be viewed as a "political institution" that promotes gender inequality, and how the lesbian continuum is understood by Rich to be suppressed by this institution. I will also argue the extent to which I believe her theory to be limited in its depth of exploration of how many women can find liberation in their heterosexuality, and yet, that the theory is also a valuable tool in deconstructing ways in which we view gender inequality and how it can benefit feminism.

In order to discuss how Rich sees heterosexuality as a "political institution", it is necessary to define what her definition of this institution is; Rich uses an analogy in order to compare compulsory heterosexuality as an institution of gender inequality to the caste system as an institution of racism. In the sense that the pervasive ideas of any institution must be "imposed, . . . and maintained by force" in order to control the members of a society, the two cases Rich compares have similarities; both are maintained with "physical violence" and "false consciousness" (Rich 1980, 648). For heterosexuality, these two forces are manifest in the propensity for male violence against women and marital rape, and society's default assumption that all women are naturally heterosexual. As a political institution, heterosexuality arises from and contributes to gender inequality, as it forces heterosexual roles upon women to be the objects of men's desires and to be the outlets of their power. Rich asserts that power is ensured for men in heterosexuality by making

women available to men "physical [ly], economical [ly], and emotional [ly]" (Rich 1980, 647). Physically, women are viewed as an outlet for men's sexual desire, in the social acceptance of prostitution as an inevitable and normalized activity. Economically, women are a source of labor that are generally underpaid and promoted less than men; coupled with the social assumption that women must raise their children women also exist as an unpaid source of production in this way. Emotionally, women are a source of companionship and support to man instituted in the legal bond of marriage. Compulsory heterosexuality is the amalgamation of forces that coerce women to participate in a society where men have structured women's roles to serve and maintain male power and gender inequality.

I will now discuss another way in which the theory of compulsory heterosexuality addresses the oppression that women face in patriarchal society's attempt to control and suppress the "lesbian continuum". Rich describes the lesbian continuum as a collection of all "woman—identified experience [s]" (Rich 1980, 648). Rich understands this term to

include not only the purely sexual and erotic relationships between women classically labeled "lesbian", but to expand the term to champion all of the deep and meaningful relationships that exist between women—whether they be sexual or platonic. Women-centered relationships, existing as points on a continuum of lesbian experiences, constitute the sharing of an "inner life" and the bond against "male tyranny" between women that face the same oppression by the patriarchy (Rich 1980, 649). The friendships and bonds between women are often overlooked and suppressed by compulsory heterosexuality in a way that erases lesbian experiences. Thus, in order to gain acceptance and respect in the eyes of men, women must work to identify themselves (as heterosexual women) with men, forcing them to "turn away" form the "primary relationships" and the bonds they shared with women (Rich 1980, 645). As an example of this phenomenon, women who once shared deep and intimate bonds with her female friends, now turn to men for reasons such as securing financial stability for her future, as a woman who is single may not be able to enjoy the same privileges that an allegiance to a man may afford her.

I will now give my own evaluation of Rich's theory of compulsory heterosexuality. I would like to assert that the theory's main limitation is that it does not fully provide concessions for women to be liberated in their heterosexuality. The view that heterosexuality is a construction of systemic gender inequality is problematic for the way women view their situation in the world and sexual experiences. Many women who identify as heterosexual could view their sexuality as something to be wary of, and be critical of their own experiences. The theory does not make a concession that women can also find liberation in heterosexual experiences, as women should be recognized as sexual beings in any way they feel to be. Rich's theory may limit a woman's own individual sexual liberation because she is convinced that social forces have molded her in a way that serves the male power system (Rich 1980, 647). I have known many strong feminist women who have found sources of strength and equal partnership in heterosexual relationships; they have entered and remained true to themselves as women and to their own expression of their sexuality. Though I also believe that in order for liberation in heterosexuality to exist, one must be paired with a thorough education and knowledge—both on the part of the man and women—of the historical and lasting power imbalances between men and women, and the ways in which heterosexual relationships may be influenced and even distorted, by the heteronormative power system. Rich does not make the means for overcoming these patriarchal structures known, even though I believe that they are possible in some ways—like that which is aforementioned. Although the theory is limited in this way, I must also argue that the theory renders itself a valuable tool in the effort to deconstruct the way in which gender inequality is perceived; perhaps,

even enlightening women to find their own liberation and strength in their relationships, especially those heterosexual ones. The arguments made by Rich in this theory are effective in our exploration and understanding of the normalized forces of oppression that women face. This theory can be effective in the feminist fight against the domination of male power and undermine women's subjugation. Rich's understanding of women on a lesbian continuum celebrates woman-identified relationships and begins to shed light on the importance and liberation women find in friendships and bonds with other women—uniting them as a stronger feminist body.

Rich's theory of compulsory heterosexuality is explained as the political institution used to coerce women into behaving heterosexually and to suppress meaningful relationships between women. Heterosexuality is maintained in ways that shape women to be available physically, economically, and emotionally available to men and sustain patriarchal power. While her theory may be problematic for women who identify as heterosexual because it does not account for the fact that they can find individual sexual liberation in this way, it is also a useful theory for the feminist struggle against oppression. Rich's theory is a thorough deconstruction of the sources of gender inequality maintained by the forces of heterosexuality that permeate women's lives. Further research into the effects that this theory would have on heterosexual women would be fascinating, as a woman may struggle to grasp her sexuality if she sees herself, considering this theory, as a product of a political institution that molded her in heterosexuality.

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Identity and Difference in Art Historical Practice: A Critical Examination of the Scholarship of Griselda Pollock and Amelia Jones

Erika Kindsfather

Feminist art historians Griselda Pollock and Amelia Jones deal with this issue of visualizing gender in their art historical scholarship, problematizing the concepts of vision and identity in relation to one another in subverting exclusionary histories established in the male—dominated canon. I seek to examine methodological differences between the two art historians, and identify the role of the feminist art historian as they situate themselves within the field. I argue that a feminist intervention in art historical knowledge production requires not only the construction of feminist assertions into the rhetoric of the field, but also calls for a deconstruction of canonical claims. In examining the work The Dinner Party by Judy Chicago, I guide my argument in a visual context.

To delineate the challenges faced by scholars of art historical practice that impose narratives of marginalized identities into the field's hetero-patriarchal canon, I will appeal to the relationship between language and thought as proposed by Steven Pinker in his article "Mentalese". Beginning the chapter with George Orwell's explanation of Newspeak and his idea that language can be used to control thought, Pinker analyses this notion with great skepticism as he draws attention to the idea that humans do not think in language, but rather in an undefined concept he refers to as mentalese. Pinker points out that "people simply assume that words determine thoughts "[1] and continues to describe and critique the concept of 'linguistic determinism"[2] developed by Sapir and Whorf. Linguistic determinism suggests that thought is only limited to the span of an individual's language. This subversion of linguistic determinism is applicable to questioning the methodology of art historical knowledge production as it addresses the polysemous nature of language, thus challenging the assertion of canon as representative of a human totality.

1 Steven Pinker. "Mentalese." In The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language, 44–73. (New York: W. Morrow and Co.,1994), 45.
2 Pinker, "Mentalese," 46.

Yet Pinker's model of semiotics, when applied to instances of gender in language (be it the model of binary pronouns or conceptual associations of the words "male" and "female") fails to address the ubiquity of patriarchy in normalizing the misogynistic associations of concept and language. In her essay "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," Judith Butler asserts that the cultural phenomenon of gender is established through stylized acts that are repeated, coded in gendered language, and therefore perpetuated over time.[3] She argues that the concept of gender is not a pre-existing natural condition, but rather one that developed through the repetition of acts that came to be visual indicators of gender assignment in culture and language. The feminist art historian's challenge of destabilizing the institutionalized hetero-patriarchal intellectual legacy of art history is not only a challenge of interacting with art history's canonical past, but also that of language itself as it serves as a code of identification in visual culture. This yields the progression of discussions of categories of race, gender and sexuality as dependent on the historical and cultural moment in which the art historian produces her body of evidence. Though the feminist art historian interacts with scholarship of the past in fields of sociology, linguistics, and art histories, she inherently projects the moment of feminist scholarship in which she works into her methods of knowledge production because of the nature of language as limited in its ability to express concepts. In other words, the feminist art historian can appeal only to the past and present, making feminist art history a linear trajectory of knowledge production.

Feminist art historians Griselda Pollock and Amelia Jones deal with this issue of repeated visual code of gender in language and art in their writings, problematizing the concepts of vision and identity in relation to one another. That is, both scholars deal with the patriarchal device of the male gaze as it manifests in the canon of art history. John Berger illustrates this concept in saying, "men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and women but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed is female. Thus she turns herself into an object of vision: a sight."[4] I will examine how Pollock and Jones approach the production of art historical knowledge in terms of vision and identity. Placing their scholarship in conversation with each other through analysis of their respective methodological approaches to art historical knowledge production, I will use the work The Dinner Party by Judy Chicago as a visual guide to mediate discussion. This choice is deliberate on my part, as Jones deals predominantly with contemporary works (dating 1990

3 Judith Butler. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." (Theatre Journal 40.4, 1988): 519.

4 John Berger. Ways of Seeing. (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 47.

to present) while Pollock places and emphasis on representations of women in the canon of modernity (dating from the fin-de-siècle to the second world war), leaving me the challenge of finding a chronological middle ground between the scholars. With Pollock's addressing of art of the 1970s in her chapter "Screening the Seventies: Sexuality and Representation in Feminist Practice—A Brechtian Perspective" found in Vision and Difference: Femininity, Feminism, and the Histories of Art and Jones' address of the work and scholarship in "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'" in Seeing Differently: A History and Theory Identification and the Visual Arts, analysis of the methods of these two scholars in dialogue can be facilitated.

In "Screening the Seventies: Sexuality and Representation in Feminist Practice— A Brechtian Perspective," Pollock situates her audience in the 1985 exhibition Difference on Representation and Sexuality with a quote from the curator that details the its aims to reflect the idea that the framework through which culture traditionally understands sexuality is limited, calling for its revision through artistic and ideological pursuits. She continues to discuss the institutional challenges of the exhibition, as it "could only be read as in conflict with such traditionalist revivals of painting. . .,"[5] soliciting responses from critic Hal Foster, who takes issue with the opposition to Lacanian psychoanalytical legacies that the feminist exhibition poses. Pollock continues to challenge the critiques of feminist interventions in the patriarchal canon of art history and its institutions by examining an infrastructural framework through which contemporary art historical knowledge production is publicized. In the 1980 British film magazine Screen, T.J Clark appeals to a 1930s debate between Bertold Brecht and George Lukacs, calling for the revival of a dialogue weighing the virtues of realism versus modernism.[6] Film theorist Peter Wollen engaged with Clark, eventually accusing him of undermining contemporary feminist scholarship in his analysis of the avant-garde canon.

In terms of methodology, Pollock's petition to setting parallels between ideological engagements of the past and their recollections in male visual analyses of her contemporary situation raises an important question of feminist scholarship and contemporaneity. That is, in Pollock's pursuit to revise the principle of visual culture to include the narratives of women beyond the Freudian "woman as sign"[7] rhetoric, she must also interact with her male contemporaries who actively undermine the

5 Griselda Pollock. "Screening the Seventies: Sexuality and Representation in Feminist Practice—A Brechtian Perspective." In Vision and Difference: Femininity, Feminism, and Histories of Art. (London: Routledge, 1988), 156.

6 Pollock, "Screening the Seventies: Sexuality and Representation in Feminist Practice— A Brechtian Perspective,"157.

7 Sarah Kofman, The enigma of woman: woman in Freud's writings. Translated by Catharine Porter. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1985.

works of feminist scholars in their analysis of the canon. In short, the challenge of inserting questions of identity into institutional frameworks of the art magazine, exhibition, and art criticism also calls for an active resistance to exclusionary practices of persisting male scholarship. Because questions of method are fundamentally questions of evidence, I examined the works that Pollock cited in her chapter notes, finding that the majority of her cited works were dated in the seventies and eighties. This not only confirms the necessity of feminist interactions with her contemporary moment, but also raises a point concerning the role of infrastructure in subverting and projecting feminist scholarship. Having quoted articles found in Screen issues throughout her chapter, Pollock provides the reader with an interesting aside concerning the organization of the magazine. She notes the marginalization of female scholarship in the curating of magazine content, asserting that Screen created a "boys' issue" where men were given the voice of authority in leading discussions of identity originally foregrounded by feminist contemporary scholars.[8] This illustrates that while early feminist scholars worked to assert themselves into the framework of a patriarchal field, they were systematically omitted from discussions concerning their own proposed agenda. Pollock subverts this institutional exclusionary tactic by including and detailing the work by her feminist peers (such as Lucy Lippard, Mary Kelly, Carol Duncan, and Sylvia Harvey) in conversation with one another, thus creating space for feminist dialogue that various print media denied.

Pollock's assertion of feminist agendas into the discourse of art history and its infrastructures manifests especially in her 2010 essay "Encounters in the Virtual Feminist Museum: Time, Space, and the Archive" found in Feminisms is Still Our Name: Seven Essays on Historiography and Curatorial Practices, a book curated under the ideological framework that nuances the definition of feminism as one of plural identities.[9] Much like Pollock's aims to assert feminism into the framework of her contemporary art world, editors Malin Hedlin Hayden and Jessica Sjöholm Skrubbe seek to problematize the persistent narrative of the "alternativeness"[10] of female artistic pursuits in art historical legacies. In doing so, they adopt the language of Judith Butler in noting the prominence of "performative feminisms"[11] that deal not only with gender categories, but also larger discourses of power structures and infrastructural practices that enforce such arrangements. Pollock ap-

8 Details found under an aside at the bottom of the page. Pollock, "Screening the Seventies: Sexuality and Representation in Feminist Practice—A Brechtian Perspective," 157.

9 Note the editors' appeal to Butler's term "performativity." Malin Hedlin Hayden, and Jessica Sjöholm. "Preface." In Feminisms is Still Our Name: Seven Essays on Historiography and Curatorial Practices, xiii-xviii. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010.)

10 Hayden and Sjöholm, "Preface," xiii.

11 Ibid.

plies this interest in spaces of artistic display as inherently hierarchical in her analysis of the framework under which the Museum of Modern Art operates. She looks critically at the production of the concept of post-modernity, initiating the chapter with a sociological deconstruction of the term in relation to ethics, politics, and linguistics. Further, she deconstructs the practices of museums, detailing the infrastructures of the temporary gallery, history of museum foundations, and the role of these infrastructures in constructing a performative guise of historical record. Pollock applies this notion of museum as a space of controlled performance in her critique of an art historical linguistic infrastructure, or the coding of canonical visual culture into widely-used and uncontested temporal categories.[12] These categories contribute to the placement of feminist art histories as alternatives in the broader narrative of art historical legacies.

Amelia Jones subverts the confining linguistic and visual discourses that surface in art historical discussions of identity politics, or the newer concept of post-identity, the claim that with the pervasiveness of identity politics (be it questions of race, gender, or sexuality in relation to systematized power structures) in conversations about visual culture, the merit of such discussion becomes arguable. Jones circumvents this in holding that these opposing voices to discussions of identity politics in relation to art history operate under the framework of a Hegelian model, thus posing identification as creating a binary of self and other rather than a "reciprocal, dynamic, and ongoing process"[13] of coding a subject. In "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'" Jones illustrates how the polarizing model of seeing has come to be through the fetishization of icons of visual signification that come to code the other. Revisiting the quote from John Berger's Ways of Seeing, I will examine Jones' understanding of the consequences of asserting the concept of fetishization through a binary lens. Berger details the experiences of men and women in relation to each other as constructions of the understanding of self and other, the beholder and the sight. By asserting the experience of the self in relation to the other, this discourse, even with the intentions to oppose the misogynistic legacies of Freud,[14] enforces the very formula for objectifying discourse. Jones problematizes this in discussing Freud's model and late twentieth-century feminist scholars' response to him, asserting "fetishism even became fetishized by feminist visual theory from the 1970s to

12 I am referring to post-modernity in this case, as Pollock contests the uncontested infrastructure established by Alfred Barr. Griselda Pollock. "Encounters in the Virtual Feminist Museum: Time, Space, and the Archive." In Feminisms is Still Our Name: Seven Essays on Historiography and Curatorial Practices, 105–141. Edited by Hayden, Malin Hedlin, and Jessica Sjöholm. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 109.

13 Amelia Jones. "Introduction." In Seeing Differently: A History and Theory Identification and the Visual Arts. (New York: Routledge, 2012),1.

14 Sarah Kofman, The enigma of woman: woman in Freud's writings. Translated by Catharine Porter. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1985).

the 1990."[15] Yet Jones offers an explanation for why this meta-fetishization occurred in the discourse of late twentieth-century feminist theory, attributing the flawed approaches of these scholars as an effort to subvert the long-standing exclusionary history of Euro-American visual culture.

In terms of method, Jones initiates her approach with a chronological trajectory of scholarships concerning the theorization of fetishism, quoting Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Guillermo Gómez—Peña. The statements from these individuals show a shift in the understanding of the fetish, from a Freudian complex to a deconstruction of the proposed self/other binary entirely.[16] She then interacts with trends of the art market in art history by addressing questions of race in the commodification of works representing racialized bodies. By revisiting art history in regards to class and race, Jones accounts for nuances of identity in the sexist, misogynistic, and classist workings of the capitalist structure of the art market. She deconstructs fetishism into four interrelated categories, each dealing with a marginalized identification code (race, class, sexuality, and gender). She appeals to a scientific construe of understanding vision, tracing perception theory to the Renaissance and engaging with Martin Heidegger's model of "world picture".[17] She then discusses the concept of anamorphosis or a method of perceiving image as distortion. Her deconstruction of the trajectory through which humans traveled in understanding the scientific workings of vision and perception then informs Jones' analysis of contemporary art, breaking the works she presents down into politicized discussion. Jones notes her own role in art historical knowledge production (or perhaps deconstruction) in stating, "I play a key role here both in choosing the particular examples and in allowing certain aspects of each project to come to the foreground—my interpretations are themselves politicized, willed, and performative."[18] Her self-awareness in the process of forming visual theory reveals her understanding of the art historian's role in present knowledge production. She acknowledges that the framework under which an art historian operates is fundamentally an infrastructure of manipulation as it relies on asserting and subverting text and image to validate one's own claims.

I argue that the project of Judy Chicago's The Dinner Party (Fig. 1) can serve to mediate a key dialogue between Jones and Pollock's methodological approaches to art historical knowledge production. Though

15 Amelia Jones. "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'." In Seeing Differently: A History and Theory Identification and the Visual Arts. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 71.
16 Jones, "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'," 63.
17 Jones, "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'," 82-3.
18 Ibid. 89.

Jones has written extensively on the project by Chicago in "The 'Sexual Politics' of The Dinner Party: A Critical Context," I will focus on the methodology she uses in "Fetishizing the Gaze and the Anamorphic Perversion: 'The Other is You'" in order to situate The Dinner Party as a neutral intercessor between the two scholars' approaches to theory. Pollock's methodological approach places emphasis on the infrastructures of the gallery space and print media. Chicago's work is a physical imposition on the space of the gallery in its monumental size.

Fig. 1. Judy Chicago. The Dinner Party. 1974–79. Mixed media: ceramic, porcelain, extile. Brooklyn Museum. Web. Digital Image.

Fig. 2. Judy Chicago. The Dinner Party (Sojourner Truth place setting), 1974–79. Mixed media: ceramic, porcelain, textile. Brooklyn Museum. © Judy Chicago. Photograph by Jook Leung Photography. Web. Digital Image.

Chicago utilizes vaginal symbols of the flower and triangle as motifs, while emphasizing the materiality of the work as an undertaking of intense labor performed by a number of women.[19] Because of The Dinner Party's materiality and aims of asserting feminine symbols into the highly politicized space of the gallery, I speculate that Pollock would discuss the symbolic nature of this feminist imposition into the institutional space of visual culture in a positive light. Further, Pollock's active engagement with feminist art from the seventies and eighties as it was being produced would lead her to bring instances of criticism in the media from the contemporary moment into her discussion. Jones, on

19 Judy Chicago. The Dinner Party: a Symbol of our Heritage. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday. 1979).

the contrary, would be critical of the work's adherence to the polarizing visual code of gender, as Chicago asserts the work as "a symbol of our heritage"[20], implying that the female experience is collective. Jones would problematize this by discussing its consequences of re-fetishizing the identity of women in an objectifying visual language. Further, she would analyze the identities that this work omits, perhaps focusing on the minimal credit given to the individual laborers of the work, or Chicago's problematic representation of Sojourner Truth (Fig. 2) in terms of racial fetishism.[21]

In writing, art historical scholars face the challenge of reconciling the nuanced differences of language and visual culture, which inform the infrastructures in which they operate. The feminist art historian must not only negotiate space in the institutional structures of art history, but also subvert the patriarchal undertones of the semiotics and rhetoric of the field's canon. A feminist intervention in art historical knowledge production, therefore, requires not only the construction of feminist assertions into the rhetoric of the field, but also calls for a deconstruction of canonical claims. This process essentially requires an interdisciplinary approach to art historical knowledge production, as the feminist scholar must engage with patriarchal discourse that spans across the milieu of masculine academic legacy. In the trajectory of feminist art history itself, the definition of identification becomes challenged, calling for a pluralizing of the very term feminism to account for the dynamic nature of human identity itself.

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20 Emphasis added. Ibid.

21 Lorraine O'Grady, "Olympia's Maid: Reclaiming Black Female Subjectivity." In New Feminist Criticism: Art, Identity, Actions, eds. Arlene Raven, Cassandra L. Langer, Joanna Frueh (New York: Icon Editions, 1991), 152-70.

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Michael Britt

Passage Analysis: Aristotle's Physics, Book II

Michael Britt

Aristotle's teleological, or goal-oriented, understanding of causality makes perfect sense when applied to human actions, for agents take actions with outcomes in mind, yet is not as obvious when applied to the actions of "nature." Often, Aristotle compares the actions of "nature" to those carried out through human deliberation, yet he denies that "nature" has consciousness.

Further, where there is an end, all the preceding steps are taken for the sake of that. Now surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes. Now action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature were made not only by nature but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. The one, then, is for the sake of the other; and generally art in some cases completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and in others imitates nature. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products. The relation of the later to the earlier items is the same in both.

Aristotle. Phys. II. 199a9-19. Oxford Revised Translation.

Book II of Aristotle's Physics chiefly concerns his "four causes" and their relationship to art, nature, and coincidence. In the paragraph which precedes the passage above, Aristotle confronts the view that nature proceeds by "necessity" or "coincidence" and argues, to the contrary, that nature proceeds towards an "end." He argues that processes of nature cannot occur by coincidence because they occur too regularly, or in his words "always or for the most part" a certain way (e.g. it is "for

the most part" cold in the winter). In the passage above, Aristotle offers an analogy between art and nature in order to demonstrate that, though some outcomes of nature may occur by coincidence, nature does indeed act teleologically in the same way that the artist does. Essentially, he argues that both art and nature move toward final causes: that neither acts upon "necessity" or "coincidence," but rather in a series of "steps" toward some particular "end." He also argues that art is "for the sake of" nature—that it either "completes" a natural process, bringing it closer to some telos, or "imitates" nature when nature has already sufficiently "finished" something.

In this passage and Physics generally, Aristotle uses a number of technical terms. He refers to "the end" of a process of change as "that for the sake of which" the change takes place. This "end" is the "final cause," or "telos" of any natural or artificial process. To say that a process is "teleological," then, is to say that it is caused by its movement toward a goal. Aristotle's distinction between what is "natural" and what is "artificial," or created by "art," is central to the passage. He makes the distinction most clearly at the beginning of Book II of the Physics, explaining that natural things have within them "a principle of motion and stationariness," while artificial things such as beds and coats "have no innate impulse to change," and thus must be made to change by artifice.[1] Aristotle is vague, however, about what constitutes an "action." In the passage above, he seems to draw a distinction between "action" and "nature" when he writes "as in action, so in nature," with the implication that "action" is artificial. Earlier in Physics, however, he writes that "action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature."[2]

The confusion between these two senses of "action" points toward a problematic implication of the passage. By using artistic intention as an analogy for his teleological model of nature, Aristotle implicitly attributes some deliberative intentionality to nature. If we are to take Aristotle's analogy seriously, then nature "acts," just as the artist does, in the pursuit of some "end." Aristotle, however, rejects the attribution of deliberation or intentionality to nature in the very next paragraph, writing: "animals [. . .] make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation."[3] In Aristotle's view, that which nature makes is caused by the "principle of motion" within the natural object, not by the intention of any agent. If the spider is the same as the artist, however, then it must intend the web that it makes. This would be to understand nature as a thinking agent, something which Aristotle has ruled out.

1 Aristotle. Phys. II. 192b9-19. Revised Oxford Translation.
2 Aristotle. Phys. II. 199a8. Revised Oxford Translation.
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