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

Epistemic Contextualism, Expressivism, and Knowledge Attribution Edge-Cases

James Risk

Philosophers have noticed that "knows," when embedded in sentences like "S knows that P," behaves in strange ways. While we are keen to attribute knowledge to ourselves and others in everyday contexts, we become less willing to accept attributions when we begin to entertain possible counter-examples to our claims, and move into more skeptical attitudes. This paper explores two alternative approaches to explaining the semantics of knowledge attributions: epistemic contextualism and epistemic expressivism. Contextualism holds that "knows," embedded in knowledge attributions, changes its content depending on its context of utterance. As stakes rise, the conditions required to satisfy "knows that p" become less attainable. Expressivsm prioritizes pragmatics over semantics, and claims that attributing knowledge involves taking on normative commitments independent of the truth values of the propositions involved. We become less willing to attribute knowledge in skeptical scenarios, because we would be subjecting ourselves to commitments we could never fulfill. I argue in favor of epistemic expressivism by introducing an interesting type of linguistic data into my discussion. The sorts of attributions I explore ("edge case attributions") are the kind that we are most familiar with in ordinary epistemic discourse; things like "I knew you could do it," rather than statements explicitly of the form "S knows that P."

Keywords: epistemic contextualism, epistemic expressivism, knowledge attributions, semantics, pragmatics.

If we examined each use of the term "know," we would end up with a strange array of data. We ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others quite readily, yet attempts to analyze what exactly is being ascribed lead to alarmingly strong arguments against us having any knowledge at all. Epistemic contextualism—in this case, the version of contextualism presented by David Lewis in "Elusive Knowledge"—is an attempt to provide an explanation of knowledge attributions that can make sense of our ordinary epistemic practices, while also recognizing the force of skeptical arguments. Contextualism is largely a linguistic thesis, and as such, has to compete with other approaches to explaining language use. Expressivism, more frequently encountered in metaethics than in epistemology, is one such alternative.

I will argue that expressivism can provide a more informative characterization of knowledge attributions than Lewisian contextualism. I will examine what I call "knowledge attribution edge-cases"—knowledge ascriptions that, compared to the sorts of straightforward utterances contextualists typically appeal to like "S knows that P," are so casual that they have been pushed to the periphery of discussions of knowledge-attribution. I will then explain why expressivism's comparative facility in explaining such cases is a problem for contextualism. I begin by outlining Lewis's version of contextualism. I then introduce and explicate the relevant type of expressivism, borrowing primarily from Mattew Chrisman's article, "From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism." Then, I argue that expressivism can better accommodate attribution edge-cases. Finally, I present and defend against a possible objection to my argument.

Lewisian Epistemic Contextualism

According to Lewis, "we know a lot" (549). We also tend to think that to *know* P, means being able to definitively eliminate the possibility that not-P. Unfortunately for us, the skeptic can point to a lot of situations in which we say that we know that P, yet we are unable to rule out not-P. The skeptical argument proceeds thus: (1) I know that I am currently writing an epistemology essay. (2) I also know that if I am writing an epistemology essay, then I am not currently lying, semi-conscious, on a Norwegian forest floor. At this point, the skeptic intervenes, and reminds me of my somewhat lax approach to mushroom foraging: I cannot eliminate the possibility that I have picked the wrong mushroom, and am now hallucinating. (3) I therefore have to grant that I *do not*, after all, know that I am not currently lying on a forest floor. And thus, by *modus tollens*, since I do *not* know that I am not lying on a forest floor, (C) I do *not* know that I am writing an essay. My ordinary knowledge has been erased.

The skeptical argument exploits the intuition that knowledge precludes error, that knowledge seems "by definition infallible" (Lewis 549). It seems, then, that—unless we say that we

can know that P without eliminating the possibility that not-P (which would admit that knowledge is fallible, a bizarre notion, which would permit counterintuitive utterances of the form "I could be wrong about P, but I know that P")—we do not, after all, know that P. We are left with a choice between admitting that knowledge is fallible, or—if we want to retain knowledge's infallibility—admitting that we have no knowledge (skepticism). Neither option is especially appealing. Lewis would prefer to "dodge the choice" altogether (550).

Epistemic contextualism is a *semantic* theory; it is concerned with the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions. With this in mind, Lewis begins by reminding us that much of our language is context-dependent: its content varies across contexts of utterance. This means that the same utterance can be true relative to one context and false relative to another. In Lewis' words, "different contexts evoke different standards of evaluation" (550). The utterance "65% is an excellent grade" may be true relative to a context in which the class average was 55%, and false relative to one in which the average was 85%; the utterance "John is tall" may be true when he's surrounded by a group of jockeys, but false if he's surrounded by a group of basketball players.

Lewis suggests that the same might be true for knowledge attributions. If the term "know(s)" is an indexical (its content is context-sensitive), the propositional content of sentences that include "know(s)" change over contexts (Lewis 550). Thus, the standards we apply in determining the truth of knowledge ascriptions vary over contexts as well. With this idea put forward, Lewis can say that by entertaining skeptical hypotheses, we enter a new context, thus changing the content of "know(s)" and the truth-conditions of the propositions within which it is embedded. Entertaining skeptical hypotheses raises the contextual standards for knowledge such that all of our knowledge ascriptions come out false. Conceding ground to the skeptic is not so bad, however; in everyday contexts, standards are low enough to retain the truth of knowledge ascriptions (Lewis 550). We can thus hold on to our everyday knowledge-attribution practices while recognizing the strength of the skeptical argument.

To specify his argument, Lewis provides a definition of what it means to satisfy a knowledge-attribution: "S knows proposition *P* iff *P* holds in every possibility left uneliminated by *S's* evidence" (551). Though Lewis's definition obscures his target to a certain extent, I will again emphasize that Lewis is worried about *semantics*: his definition tells us what it means to satisfy the predicate "knows that P."

Several terms in this definition are technical, and Lewis allots a considerable amount of space to explicating each of them. The one most relevant for my purposes is his use of the term "every." "Every"—a quantifier—ranges over a restricted domain. When we say "every unelimi-

nated possibility," we inevitably exclude certain possibilities. By "everything" or "everyone" we typically mean to refer to everything or everyone within a particular conversational context (e.g., "I want to see everyone before I go back"). Eliminating literally every possibility would be both impossible and unhelpful. Given that our decisions about what to exclude cannot be arbitrary, we need some way to determine what can rightly be ignored (i. e. , determine the domain that "every" ranges over). To this end, Lewis introduces seven rules to determine what counts as relevant. I will only examine his *Rule of Attention*, which does most of the work in Lewis's response to the skeptical argument. Lewis tells us that a possibility is uneliminated as long as it is attended to, no matter how briefly. Thus a not-P possibility, no matter how outlandish, must be considered if we want to eliminate all not-P possibilities.

The reason why skepticism seems so natural when doing epistemology thus becomes clear: "do some epistemology. Let your fantasies rip… Now that you are attending to them, just as I told you to, you are no longer ignoring them" (Lewis 559). Doing epistemology lands us "in a context with an enormously rich domain of potential counter-examples to ascriptions of knowledge" (Lewis 559). When we expand our domain to such an extent, virtually every knowledge attribution will come out false; we will inevitably come across uneliminated not-P possibilities: I can never be sure that I am not hallucinating. We raise the bar too high (Lewis 559). Lewis is arguing for a type of *ascriber-sensitivity*. The possibilities that cannot be ignored are the possibilities thought up by those who ascribe knowledge, not the subjects of those ascriptions (Lewis 561).

Lewis ends by tying his seven rules to the reasons we use knowledge ascriptions at all. We can say that to "know" P means being able to eliminate all not-P possibilities (infallibilism), as long as we include the additional clause that we may ignore a good number of those not-P possibilities (Lewis 563). We have to include this clause to cover for our own cognitive inadequacies: knowledge attributions are a "very sloppy way of conveying very incomplete information about the elimination of possibilities"; they are "a handy but humble approximation […] indispensable in practice" (Lewis 563).

Chrisman's Epistemic Expressivism

Though contextualism offers us a very elegant response to the skeptic by introducing the notion of variable contextual standards for the truth of knowledge attributions, Chrisman points out that contextualism presupposes that knowledge attributions can be explained in *descriptivist* terms (227). Descriptivism assumes that language's role is in describing, or representing, the world, and thus accepting descriptivism entails focusing on the truth-conditions of linguistic expres-

sions, which are evaluations of how well our descriptions match the world. Turning to expressivism would involve abandoning the presupposition that description is (epistemic) language's only function, and the consequence that knowledge attributions should be explained in terms of their truth-conditions.

Chrisman separates expressivism from descriptivism by way of a distinction between "semantic pragmatics" and "pragmatic pragmatics" (236). "Semantic pragmatics" is interested in how—simply put—context of utterance fills in linguistic content in such a way that what is communicated can be rendered exclusively in propositions (or "affects semantic content by determining the value of deictic elements");[1] "pragmatic pragmatics" is concerned with the way expressions can be used to perform "expressive actions" (Chrisman 236). "Expressive actions" denote the type of language use that expresses "action-directed states of mind," rather than "descriptive states of mind." This distinction captures the intuition that sometimes we use language to describe the world (which produces truth-apt expressions), while other times we use language to bring about some change in the world (Chrisman 236).

"Action-directed states of mind" are characterized as states of mind combining normative and factual-belief states. The expressivist would claim that some language (in this case, epistemic language) expresses the acceptance of a certain set of norms, such that the subject of that attribution is in some circumstance in which these norms apply. This last clause indicates a belief about how the world is, and thus the expressed state *contains* a factual belief (Chrisman 237). The expressivist must grant that such expressions still contain descriptive content (otherwise, given that a lot of our language is truth-apt, expressivism is a non-starter), but that content is not all those expressions express. "The key issue is whether the claims are treated descriptively or nondescriptively—not whether they are treated as truth-evaluable or not" (Chrisman 247).

In developing his position, Chrisman refers to Michael Ridge's "ecumenical expressivism." Ridge explains his position like this: when we say "there's something about Mary," we express an attitude of approval towards Mary, and we do so in virtue of her having some prop-

1. An important note here is that Gricean conversational implicature is included in semantic pragmatics. Much of what we say is indirect, but still propositional. Utterances such as "you're standing on my foot," or "I'm hungry" generate implicatures like "get off of my foot" or "let's go eat." The idea is that conversation is cooperative. Interlocutors assume that all involved are equally cooperative, and aim to make contributions that all parties recognize as harmonizing with some mutually recognized conversational goal (Grice 26). These utterances ("I'm hungry," etc.) violate a rule of conversation (e.g., we should only say what is relevant), and the listener fills in propositional content such that the relevant utterance fits a given conversational goal—they try to find some way to make an apparently irrelevant utterance relevant (Grice 28). This is not the mechanism behind expressivism. Pragmatic pragmatics is concerned with what is not propositional.

erty. Someone who assented to this utterance being true, would not be expressing their belief that Mary does, in fact, have "some property" (which would be trivially true—of course she has "some property"), they would be "[expressing] suitable pro-attitudes with respect to Mary in virtue of some of her properties" (Ridge 315). On one hand, there is factual belief about some property being instantiated, but more importantly, there is the expression of a certain pro- or con-attitude. Saying that "it would be a bad idea to eat that bright red mushroom" expresses a con-attitude towards bad ideas, conjoined to the descriptive belief that eating bright red mushrooms satisfies the predicate "is a bad idea." And note that "the utterance manages to do all of this without inheriting the truth-conditions of the belief it expresses" (Ridge 314): though the belief modified by the attitude is truth-apt, the attitude expressed is not.

Whereas the contextualist explains the truth of knowledge-attributions in terms of a proposition indexed to a context-sensitive set of standards, the expressivist suggests that knowledge attributions express "states of epistemic norm acceptance," a complex state of mind composed of a set of truth-apt beliefs and the acceptance of an epistemic norm (Chrisman 241). "Epistemic norms," at least the relevant ones, are whatever norms contribute to determining whether someone is entitled to their belief (Chrisman 242). The contextualist's "S's true belief that P meets epistemic standards *e*" is transformed into "S is entitled by norms *e* to her true belief that P" (Chrisman 242). We ascribe knowledge when we think someone's belief satisfies whatever norms are involved in "taking someone to know something" (Chrisman 242). For example, the utterance of "Lucy knows that Mark was absent today, because an oracle told her so" involves the descriptive belief that Mark was absent, and expresses the acceptance of the norm that being told P by an oracle entitles belief in P. We make knowledge attributions as a way of balancing epistemic authority. We may use attributions to try and persuade someone to trust us, or as a way of telling whether we can trust others. Knowledge attributions are necessary for entitling certain beliefs.

The expressivist explains variations in high standards and low standards contexts in terms of cross-context differences in an attributor's accepted norms—which is in turn dependent on the reasons for which the attributor is ascribing knowledge in the first place—rather than variations in propositional content and subsequent variation in truth-conditions (Chrisman 242). In context A, an attributor might abide by some set of norms that permits them to grant a subject knowledge. Simultaneously, there may be another context B, with an attributor that abides by some other set of norms that rules out attributing knowledge to the same subject. Disagreements are not immediately obvious because the attributors in question are not primarily *describing* through

propositional content: they are expressing opposing states of norm acceptance. Thus, there is no logical contradiction in conflicting attributions. We are shifting from semantics (giving priority to propositional content) to pragmatics (giving priority to what speakers want to do), and the people involved in disagreement are trying to do different things (Chrisman 243).

Similarly, the conflict between the skeptical conclusion and our everyday ascriptions is *pragmatic*. Contextualists claim that the skeptical paradox holds because low standard and high standard attributions are grammatically identical, and, by mistakenly assuming that "knows" has the same content in each attribution, we take a superficial negation as a genuine semantic negation. Under expressivism, the skeptic makes us accept a certain set of norms and makes us think those norms apply in all contexts. Again, there is no logical contradiction here, we are simply led to accept an overly exclusive set of norms (Chrisman 245). We cannot follow skeptical and ordinary norms at the same time, but "we can follow one epistemic norm in one context and another in another context" (Chrisman 246).

Chrisman sees knowledge attributions as a behavior bound up with broader social practices: "Knowledge attributions, then, could be seen as playing a crucial role in keeping track of who can be trusted about which kinds of information. [. . .] When we attribute knowledge of a specific truth to someone—'S knows that p'—we thereby commit ourselves to the truth of p" (243). The bottom line is this: "expressivism involves treating anyone who thinks that their knowledge claims are purely descriptive, i. e. expressive of matter-of-factual beliefs, as mistaken" (Chrisman, 246).

Knowledge Attribution Edge Cases

I share Chrisman's aversion to contextualism's descriptivist assumptions. The issue for contextualism is that many of our knowledge attributions—especially those that seem offhand or casual, which I will call attribution "edge cases"—seem to be a matter of endorsement or disapproval. We can imagine, having made an especially stupid mistake, that a friend might confront us with a question like: (1) "Why did you do that? *You knew* what would happen!" Or, say your friend Laura has very explicitly endorsed you in reference to some competition, and thus has some interest in you winning (we can also just say that she wants you to win because you are her friend). Upon you winning, she exclaims: (2) "*I knew* you'd pull it off!"

Contextualism's descriptivist assumptions cannot be cleanly reconciled with these types of casual attributions. Contextualists typically appeal to examples of attributions that involve a subject and a proposition, separated by "knows": ideally clear attributions of the form "S knows that P." From a contextualist perspective, examples of utterances that are conventionalized—the

sort of thing that we encounter in everyday language—and involve "knows" but lack a clearly embedded proposition, are simply not very interesting. But, though we might be quick to push these uses of "know(s)" to the periphery, they merit our interest. Further, the interesting pieces are those that cannot be translated into propositional content. (1) is, and is intended as, a reprimand; (2) is, and is intended as, an expression of approval. Being on the receiving end of (1) would make us feel embarrassed, or guilty, or ashamed. Being on the receiving end of (2) might make us feel proud, and further, would make us feel—in some sense—indebted to Laura for her confidence. These are partially matters of stipulation, but I think both stipulations are modest and intuitive.

When Laura exclaims "*I knew* you'd pull it off!" she is not literally telling you that she knew (unless she were clairvoyant, she could never have known a probabilistic outcome). If that were all she had been doing, it would be an interesting fact, but insufficient to explain why we interpret her remark as a compliment. Expressivism can accommodate this fact. When Laura says she "knew," she is claiming that she satisfies some norm that entitles her to knowledge. As a tentative explanation, we might say that she is expressing her acceptance of the norm "only bet on sure things" and thus implying her belief that you winning was a sure thing. By attributing herself knowledge, she is expressing her acceptance of a normative commitment, and thus opening herself up to potential sanction if you fail to win.

When our friend tells us "*You knew* what would happen!" he is not literally informing us that we knew what would happen. Rather, he is sanctioning our failure to abide by an epistemic norm that we were expected to abide by. By attributing us knowledge (which, under expressivism involves the belief that we satisfied knowledge-giving norms), he is making explicit the fact that we were subject to a certain set of norms (perhaps that we should be able to use propositions we know as premises in our practical reasoning), and, on that basis, are expected to act in a certain way. He is acting on the assumption that we have done something that we should not have done: we had knowledge, but did not act as such.

The descriptive elements of the sentence fall short of capturing why we understand his exclamation as a reprimand. To be reprimanded is to be sanctioned for violating some norm. To be sanctioned for violating a norm, our sanctioners must have believed us to have been subject to said norm. If knowledge attributions express norm acceptance, then we have an explanation for why attributors readily sanction those who have failed to live up to their prescribed norms, even though such information is omitted from the propositional content of attributions. Chrisman would claim that the expressed norm acceptance is not descriptive—it is not telling us

anything—it is an attempt to influence us. This fits nicely with our intuitions: "You knew what would happen!" has no informational value, and thus whether or not it is true (which is what contextualism focuses on) is not important. It is an attempt to influence, and correct behavior.

A natural objection at this point would be to target my reasons for calling these types of attributions "edge cases." Perhaps these are cases that should be ignored. After all, though she used the word "knew," Laura's utterance, strictly speaking, is false—her utterance is not an example of an utterance involving knowledge. Thus, these look like knowledge attributions, but may be something else altogether.

But if the contextualist opted for this route, they would have to accept an extremely dramatic type of semantic blindness. They would have to argue that Laura is using "know(s)" (or its cognates) to mean something other than what we would mean in a more straightforward knowledge attribution. Such a distinction would involve positing a change in lexical meaning. If we applied David Kaplan's analysis of indexicals to knowledge attributions (Blome-Tillmann 22), the contextualist would not only have to admit that "knows" changes its content (what it contributes to the proposition it is a part of), but also that different uses of "know(s)" could involve different characters (whatever it is that gives an utterance of an indexical, like "know(s)," its content in a given context). The contextualist would have to argue that we actually have two words, both spelled "knows," that ordinary speakers could never distinguish between. This would be a very unintutive idea to accept. The contextualist is better off granting that these really are knowledge attributions, and that "know(s)" retains its character across uses.

The contextualist could also object to my argument by claiming that the utterances I have mentioned are instances of *loose talk*. Perhaps Laura's literal words are false, but still worth saying to meet some other end—the sort of thing that happens when I, seeing 2:57 on my watch, reply with "three o'clock" after you ask what time it is. The contextualist can then say that Laura's case is an exceptional kind of utterance, and can be thrown out.

The issue here is that the contextualist cannot easily argue that their rules should be applied so selectively; if loose talk fits this case, the contextualist has to explain why it fails to generalize to more standard attributions, and why the indexicality of "knows" is absent. Appealing to loose talk would also seriously undermine contextualism for reasons other than methodology. Loose talk is thought to be either pragmatic, or semantic but non truth-conditional, both of which are incompatible with contextualism (Russell 792). For this reason, proponents of loose talk typically subscribe to *epistemic invariantism*, the idea that "knows" is *not* a context-sensitive term—the negation of contextualism. This objection further motivates alternatives to contextual-

ism.

Contextualism can successfully accommodate much of our ordinary epistemic thought and talk, but ultimately falls short in important ways. Its commitment to truth conditions obscures the normative force of knowledge attributions, and thus renders it incapable of explaining many of our epistemic intuitions. Expressivism's emphasis on norms over truth thus makes it a more appealing candidate than contextualism when it comes to explaining knowledge-attributions.

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What is the Hegelian Account of Freedom?

Blaise Brosnan

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Hegel's theory of freedom as a societal phenomenon. I first illustrate the relationship between Hegel's account of freedom and that of his intellectual forebearer Kant. Kant treated freedom as the ability to live by a self-determined set of rational and universally applicable moral rules. Hegel concurs with Kant that freedom consists in autonomously recognizing a universal set of ethical precepts, but also postulates that the recognition of such a universal set of precepts to live by is an intersubjective process, with our autonomy being grounded in our ability to recognize our rights and duties to others in our particular political society. The final section of the article illustrates the egalitarian implications of Hegel's account of freedom: I primarily note that extreme societal inequalities may hamper the ability of members of society to possess meaningful rights and duties to one another and, thus, threaten freedom in political society. I end by reflecting on the affinity between Hegel's account of freedom and contemporary non-dominative accounts of freedom, which emphasize not being arbitrarily dominated by others as an essential aspect of freedom.

Key words: Hegel, freedom, political theory, perfectionism, Kant.

One of the most prevalent conceptions of the relationship between the individual and the state in modern political thought is that of liberal individualism. The fair individualist may ground human freedoms, such as the right to free speech or the right to freedom of association, in either the right of each individual to be free from arbitrary interference or the perfectionist mandate that each individual be the author of their own destiny. Both approaches, however, suffer from serious flaws. As Charles Taylor has argued, the first approach fails because an excessive emphasis on freedom as mere non-interference ignores the fact that our conception of what it means to be free is underpinned by a non-neutral normative account of human dignity. We would not, for instance, regard citizens in a dictatorial state as more free than citizens in a democratic state simply because they had fewer traffic lights to interfere with their daily commute (Taylor 150-151). Rather, our conception of freedom is underpinned by our sense that there are higher-order freedoms, whether they be to speak freely or to practice our religion without state sanction, that take moral precedence over brute desires such as the desire to drive unimpeded by red lights. The perfectionist account of freedom, meanwhile, is ahistorical and cannot easily be squared with the equality of persons. For example, an account of freedom that emphasizes personal autonomy as an ethical value is likely to view the life choices of intellectual non-conformists as objectively more worthy than those of traditionalists.

In this paper, I will argue that Hegel's conception of freedom, as developed in his *Philosophy of Right*, provides important insights into the nature of liberty that conflict with the underlying tenets of modern individualism. I will contend that Hegel articulates a pragmatic account of the nature of freedom in which freedom can only be achieved through collective interdependence. For Hegel, freedom is best understood neither simply as demanding maximal non-interference with the acts of a subject nor as an individualist account of human autonomy, but rather as living autonomously within the bounds of a set of ethical norms that are intersubjectively recognized as legitimate and non-arbitrary. Hegel's theory of freedom, thus, provides insight on how to reconcile the perfectionist account of freedom as personal autonomy with respect for both the equality of persons and the diversity of conceptions of human freedom found across different societies and social circumstances.

One valuable aspect of Hegel's conception of freedom is his integration of a Rousseauian account of freedom as collective interdependence with a Kantian account of freedom as the ability to autonomously act according to moral ends. For Rousseau, the best kind of freedom we can hope for in political society is a kind of collective freedom in which each individual forfeits his rights to the collective in exchange for an equal role in determining the laws of the state. Howev-

er, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Kant's theory of freedom. For Kant, a significant aspect of freedom is the ability to autonomously act in accordance with universal moral ends. A special property of humankind for Kant, as developed in his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, is our property of moral autonomy—that is, our ability to self-legislate our actions according to universal ends. Kantian individualism, like other strands of perfectionism, runs the risk of incurring the charge of violating the equality of persons. If humans attain autonomy, a crucial property of dignity, by virtue of their ability to self-legislate to achieve specific moral ends, then it would seem that those who are weaker in their capacity to independently judge universal moral ends may also possess less dignity. Additionally, it seems the Kantian vision of freedom presupposes an unrealistic standard of moral autonomy. The notion that each individual can and should legislate their own moral ends through a purely rational process is at odds with the strong role conventional guidance plays in determining moral action—for even the most moral among us rarely act according to self-crafted universal principles. Instead, our morality is influenced by a myriad of cultural and political forces, whether they be our family, education, or religious background.

The Hegelian vision of freedom presents a bold attempt to resolve the challenges Kant faces by illustrating how individuals can attain moral autonomy by acting towards universal prerogatives that are intersubjectively determined. Like Kant, Hegel conceives of freedom as being constituted by the ability to act in a universally valid manner: "The right of humans to be subjectively determined as free is fulfilled when they belong to an ethical actuality […] within the ethical, they actually possess their own essence, their inner universality" (135). That is to say that, for Hegel, conscious action according to universal principles constitutes a fundamental aspect of freedom; however, such universal principles are not discovered by the rational inquiry of each free-standing individual, rather they are determined intersubjectively. On a metaphysical level, Hegel argues that ethicality itself is inextricably linked to the concrete circumstances of how human moral life is actually conducted: "But when the ethical is simply identical with the actuality of human individuals, it appears as their universal way of acting […] as such, the character of ethicality is spirit living and present in the world" (134). Furthermore, Hegel repeatedly frames the character of the ethical as the result of the union of subjectivity with objective content that can only be mediated through societal institutions, noting that "that which is objectively ethical […] is substance made concrete by subjectivity in its infinite form [… its stable] content is the laws and institutions that are in and themselves" (129).

Thus, Hegel's vision of ethicality, and by extension freedom, differs from Kant's in that

he regards our sense of moral duty as irreducibly shaped by the social structures we inhabit. Moral autonomy for Hegel requires one to consciously act in favor of some universal good, but knowledge of such a good is necessarily mediated through a stable set of societal institutions and laws. Hegel's preliminary conception of freedom is the individual's ability to transcend their particular needs in order to act in the interest of some universal principle: "Right as such, is posited as valid over against the merely immediate, particular will. This shows, generally, that freedom is no longer immediate" (89). But the nature of such ends is the product of the intersubjective process of recognizing and abstracting from each other's mutual interests, with Hegel observing that, "This liberation is formulaic in that the particularity of ends remains their grounding content [… Diogenes'] cynicism was not independent of social conditions, but rather their result: it was itself the bastard offspring of luxury" (160). Thus, for Hegel, any notion of the content of freedom is necessarily supervenient on some kind of collective interdependence. We orient our freedom towards higher-order goods, not so much because they are discovered independently, but because they are determined through a process of struggle and mutual recognition.

Hegel's account of freedom as something achieved through engaging with an interdependent set of societal structures and institutions has many attractive features and implications. For one, it may allow a substantially more egalitarian account of moral autonomy than the Kantian perfectionist view. If moral freedom is not gained through a Kantian process of deduction, but instead through a developmental process of recognizing universal principles through our interactions with others and the state, then each individual can be said to possess a requisite degree of moral autonomy simply by virtue of properly engaging in society. Similarly, by engaging in a fair economic transaction on the free market, we demonstrate our moral autonomy by acting forthrightly and consciously recognizing the other as a being worthy of our rectitude: "The ethical disposition in this system is thus rectitude [. . .] thus does one come to be recognized both in our own eyes and the eyes of others" (167).

Attaining moral autonomy, for Hegel, is not a matter of using our rational faculties to discover moral laws in a Kantian sense or the ability to act as the author of our own destiny à la Mill and modern perfectionists such as Joseph Raz. Rather, freedom is something we can achieve through mutual recognition of the rational principles that govern ethical life in a society while pursuing our own particular interests. The crucial point here is that self-legislation is not necessary in order to autonomously act in ethically meaningful ways. If I sell my car to a friend, and make sure that the inspections are done properly and that my friend is not deceived about the condition of the vehicle, I am doing something very different than self-legislating a specific

rule and following it. Rather, I am consciously apprehending the value of an already extant and historically contingent set of norms and practices, and recognizing my friend as someone with the requisite dignity to be treated according to them. A pragmatic Hegelian account of freedom, therefore, has the distinct advantage of being more amenable to the equality of persons than the Kantian view, as any individual can fulfill the demands of autonomy simply by consciously applying the myriad ethical norms we encounter in family life and civil society.

Critics may object that I have painted the Hegelian account of freedom as substantially more egalitarian than it actually is. While a Hegelian theory of freedom may account for the equality of persons on a philosophical level, the critic argues, it cannot account for inequality in a political and structural sense. As claimed by Marx in "On the Jewish Question," far from being egalitarian, the Hegelian universal state actually reinforces inequalities rather than ameliorating them. As such, the Hegelian state, in reality, presents an obstacle to a more substantive freedom: freedom from structural domination, egoism, and systematic inequalities. As Marx argues, the Hegelian opposition between citizen and bourgeois actually reinforces social inequalities: "The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself with the political man is the same contradiction in which the bourgeois find themselves with the *citoyen*, and the member of civil society as his political lion's skin" (6–7). By presenting equal citizenship as a means to freedom while doing little about class distinctions in practice, the Hegelian approach simultaneously obscures and legitimates the subordinated status of the lower classes. Moreover, Marx's argument could be extended to put pressure on Hegel's contention that agents pursuing their particular interests serve the same universal end.

While the Marxist criticism of Hegel is compelling, it underrates the crucial social egalitarian implications of Hegel's theory of freedom as collective interdependence. As I have argued, Hegel regards freedom as fundamentally intersubjective: individuals cannot genuinely be free living in an isolated state of nature, rather freedom can only take shape in a community in which individuals are recognized as having a corresponding set of rights and duties to each other. As I see it, this account of freedom has two distinct strengths. First, it opens the door to an account of freedom not as mere non-interference or self-actualization, but as non-domination and freedom from arbitrary power more broadly. One important consequence of Hegel's intersubjective account of freedom is that right-claims and duty-claims are fundamentally interdependent. For Hegel, we only have rights to things insofar as others have duties to provide them (135).

Second, as I have previously illustrated, rights and duties are not agent-neutral moral claims for Hegel. Instead, they are the result of a developmental process in which individuals

in civil and political society recognize each other as being owed reciprocal dignity and respect. Thus, from a Hegelian view, right-claims are fundamentally premised not only on our basic duty not to directly interfere with the rights of others, but on a more thoroughgoing reciprocity that suggests neutralization of extreme inequalities in wealth and personal power as well. Accordingly, the Marxist criticism that Hegel was insufficiently concerned with economic inequalities is misguided. Rather, while Hegel did indeed emphasize the importance of equal citizenship in a conventional sense, his conception of equal citizenship was itself underpinned by an awareness of the necessity of ameliorating extreme social and economic inequalities.

Accordingly, Hegel is attentive to the reality of both structural and personal domination, arguing that slaves cannot have *any* meaningful duties to their master and that the state should ameliorate the conditions of the rabble both for its own stability and out of concern for its sense of "self-sufficiency and self-respect" (188). Hegel may justify economic inequality on the grounds that it is consistent with the individual right to advance their own particular interests, but he acknowledges that inequality runs contrary to the universal moral ends he identifies with freedom (163). So, for Hegel, personal and structural domination may indeed present a threat to his conception of freedom.

The merit of Hegel's holistic account of freedom as collective interdependence against narrower accounts of freedom as non-interference, however, remains strong. As I have illustrated, the non-interference account of freedom has fundamental flaws, such as the difficulty of distinguishing between morally relevant and irrelevant forms of freedom—such as the substantive freedom of religion and arbitrary freedom to drive unimpeded by traffic lights. As Phillip Pettit has suggested, another challenge of the non-interference account of freedom is the lack of an internally coherent criterion for determining when state interference is justified to prevent a potentially greater abuse or interference by an individual or a group (64–6). Who is to say, under the non-interference schema, for instance, that the state should interfere with the free market to pass laws against workplace harassment and verbal abuse instead of simply letting employees who face such behavior quit their jobs and find better workplaces? The extent to which having a verbally abusive or openly sexist boss constitutes being unduly interfered with is, after all, questionable, for a boss chastising an employee everyday may not directly interfere with any course of action the employee might take.

By contrast, the Hegelian account of freedom as collective interdependence yields a clearer picture of how freedom is violated in such a circumstance and how the state should potentially respond. Social freedom for Hegel is premised not on non-interference or narrow con-

tractualism, but on the ability of actors to recognize each other in civil society as beings worthy of equal dignity in a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is then difficult to see how, in a contemporary reconstruction of Hegelian freedom, a relationship between an abusive boss and an employee could not constitute a violation of freedom. A relationship characterized by fear of arbitrary mistreatment at any point on the side of the employee and unjustified power to violate basic dignity and self-respect on the side of the boss cannot plausibly be reciprocal in any real sense. Thus, the Hegelian account of freedom may allow us to address circumstances of domination with more clarity than the non-interference account. Moreover, it also presents a more plausible account of when state interference is justified and when it is not. Where the non-interference standard may have difficulty determining when state interference is and is not justified, the Hegelian view presents a strong *prima facie* justification for state interference in cases when personal and structural domination undermines the possibility of reciprocal recognition and exchange.

In this article, I have articulated a defense of Hegel's account of freedom against modern perfectionist and non-interference accounts of freedom, as well as against Marxist charges that the Hegelian account is insufficiently radical. My initial argument claimed that Hegel's intersubjective account of personal autonomy provides a compelling and plausible account of freedom that resolves many of the challenges faced by the perfectionist account of individual autonomy. In particular, the Hegelian view is much easier to reconcile with the equality of persons and the diversity of conceptions of human freedom than perfectionist and Kantian visions which stress freedom as either independent self-authorship or self-legislation. As Hegel illustrates, freedom does not demand self-legislation, but rather assimilating a set of ethical norms and values that are intersubjectively rationalized and following them faithfully. Accordingly, freedom is a core property of human dignity that can be accessed by any adult of sound mind, regardless of their ability to formulate ethical laws for themselves or act as authors of their own destiny. A corollary to this principle is that the intersubjective account of human freedom can be squared much better with the diversity of conceptions of human freedom across societies than the perfectionist view. If we view autonomy not simply as the result of individual self-authorship or self-legislation, but as an intersubjective phenomenon that involves abstracting from the mutual needs of members of society, then we get an account that may be amenable to a more pluralistic conception of freedom that is sensitive to different cultures and contexts.

Finally, I articulated the merit of the Hegelian account of freedom as collective interdependence against the view of freedom as non-interference. On the account of freedom as non-in-

terference, there are a wide variety of actions that don't directly interfere with one's actions while nevertheless creating an atmosphere of unjustified domination, such as the issuance of threats and abuse by authority figures. By mandating that genuine freedom rests on the recognition of others as relative equals, however, Hegel provides a forceful illustration of the necessity of an account of freedom that excludes unjustified domination of others. Therefore, I have shown that Hegel's account of freedom presents a valuable alternative against two modern accounts of the nature of freedom, and how it can be used to launch a radically egalitarian account of liberty in contemporary society.

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The Limits of Language: Interrogating Martin Buber's Philosophy of Dialogue

Frances MacInnis

In his essay *I and Thou*, Martin Buber argues that humans are ontologically dialogical: how we 'speak' to the world determines our relationship to it, and by extension, our experience within it. For Buber, there are two ontological possibilities. We may speak to the world as Thou, abandoning a predicative gaze and uplifting the centrality of other entities in the world. Alternatively, we may speak to the world as It, adopting an objectifying gaze that seeks to categorize and master all that one perceives. In this paper, I challenge Buber's philosophy of dialogue by problematizing the act of writing, charging him with the use of a predicative form to describe an ontological relation to the world which he argues eludes predication. This problem is vast, for Buber argues that predication alters the ontological constitution of entities in the world. Therefore, the Thou Buber experiences, and the 'Thou' Buber writes about, are incongruent possibilities. In other words, this essay asks the paradoxical question: how can we talk about what we *can't* talk about? As a response, I consider the role of poetic prose and Platonic dialogue as methods of philosophical demonstration that may avoid objectification. Ultimately, this essay will argue that a more effective resolution to the problem lies in reimagining the polarization of the Thou and It relationships. If these realms are understood as overlaid upon each other, rather than exclusive ontological realities, the problem of writing dissolves.

Keywords: dialogue, writing, Martin Buber, predication, language, phenomenology, ontology.

I. Introduction

Language occupies a central role in human experience; this assertion is hardly controversial. For some, however, it does not go nearly far enough. Among these thinkers is philosopher Martin Buber, best known for his essay *I and Thou* (*Ich und Du*). For Buber, humans are ontologically dialogical, and the way in which we dialogue with the world makes up our experience within it. Our ontological relation to the world can occur in one of two modes: the dialogical relationship may be predicative and objectifying, or it may uphold the centrality of all other beings in the world.

I will begin with a sketch of Buber's philosophy of language, which will provide the foundation for my primary aim. This aim is to expose a problem central to Buber's 'two-fold' view of language: namely, how to communicate that which transcends the linguistic form. The written form, I will show, is fundamentally objectifying, for it must give names and descriptions to what it considers. I will contend that Buber is confronted with a bind—he seeks to explain what goes beyond predicative language, with only the tool of predicative language at his disposal. Buber recognizes this tension, and attempts to remedy it through poetic writing. I will evaluate this solution, as well as another possible method of communicating with one's 'whole being, ' namely, the Socratic dialogical form displayed in Plato's dialogues. These two methods of demonstrations, I will argue, provide instances of non-objectifying communication, yet still fail to avoid predication. From this basis, I will argue that writing is bound up in the process of mastery and thus cannot capture the nature of Buber's dialogical phenomena. A reformulation of the polarized relationship between Buber's two worlds, however, may be able to provide for the existence of non-objectified communication *within* a predicative framework. If we understand the *I-It* and *I-Thou* word-pairs not as exclusive, but as ontological conditions overlaid upon each other, poetic writing and the Socratic dialogues may be redeemed as methods of communicating transcendent truths through writing.

II. Buber's Philosophy of Language

Buber's philosophy of language begins with a fundamental duality. For Buber, the world presents itself to mankind in two ways, depending on which of two possible attitudes one takes up. These attitudes, he maintains, are connected to two word pairs that one may speak—*I-Thou*, or *I-It*. The chain of influence is established as follows: the dialogue one takes up with the world determines the perspective one adopts, which in turn, affects the very nature of the world one is confronted with. Buber presents language as *the fundamental means by which* one encounters and makes up

the world they inhabit (Buber 3).

These basic word combinations are relational. They do not name things in the world, but establish a relationship as they are pronounced. How these words are spoken, and what kind of relationship they create, Buber stipulates, are distinct. The form of the individual who enters into a relation categorized by objectification is distinct from the form of those who accept the centrality of others. Thus, one should be cautious to perceive these word pairs as simply changes of addressee. They represent distinct ontologies, binding those who utter the word-pair and the beings to whom their words refer in a symmetrical relation (Buber 3).

The first basic word pair Buber calls the I-Thou. This relationship comes to be when one speaks to the world, and thus experiences it, with their whole being. This is an ontological reality that comes to be when "the speaker has no thing for his object," but rather, all that one encounters is viewed as having its own centrality (4). Thus, this relation is embodied, unbounded, and allows those who speak the word-pair to step into the realm of relationality. Within this relation there are no objects, for one abandons perception. The exact nature of this relation is difficult to parse; since this word pair transcends the bounds of the object world, natural language fails to provide a sufficient account. Buber provides an example that may serve to disambiguate this relation.

To speak to another as a Thou, Buber illustrates, is to distance them from their bounded identity as a *He*, or *She*, and thus, to see them as detached from their individual predicative qualities. Buber compares this process of 'depredication' as seeing another as we experience a melody when we allow it to flow through us—not as a sum of its parts, but rather, as a unification of notes whose individual identity is lost as it is woven together (8). Given that part of Buber's project is to determine how we dialogue with God through our ontological relation to the world, the I-Thou relation is central to his description of religious experience: to dialogue with Deity, for Buber, is to converse with the eternal Thou.

The second element of Buber's dual account of language is the word-pair I-It. This relation emerges when one refuses to acknowledge the centrality of other beings in the world. An I-It relationship consists in perceiving the predicative qualities of something, rather than its completeness. Thus, other beings are stripped of their individuality, seen as outside objects with distinct features that can be enumerated and categorized. This relationship is asymmetrical, uplifting one's own mastery while diminishing the centrality of another. The object becomes simply "a given quantity with a certain shape" (Buber 17). Although our relation to the world, for Buber, takes up one of these two possibilities, it is not a stagnant dualism. Buber suggests that these

two modes of being fight for dominance, and it is usually the I-It relation which overpowers its counterpart. Although we may experience another as a Thou, as soon as we come to realize the nature of our relationship with that being, the I-Thou world disappears. Since we must remove ourselves from our direct relation to observe exactly what it means to exist in that relation, the I-Thou is only observed through an I-It perspective. To categorize our relationship with a Thou, we make them an object. Thus, "every Thou in the world is by its nature fated to become a thing" (Buber 17).

Buber draws out this dual understanding of language through a phenomenological analysis of the forms which one's interaction with nature can take. He contends that, in considering a tree, a number of possible ways of relating to the tree open up to him. He can examine the tree as a picture, catalogue its movement, or reduce it to its biological classification, to name a few. These methods are all rooted in the act of perception and serve, Buber argues, to confine the tree to its position in space and time, reducing it to an object viewed from the position of the subject's centrality—an It (7).

Alternatively, Buber suggests, one may become "bound up in relation to [the tree]" (7). Entering into this relation requires both the will to do so, and the grace to acknowledge the tree's centrality. Just like an individual note in a melody, one allows the tree to hang beyond its position in space and time, not to be experienced nor perceived, but nonetheless to be understood. Once again, however, this relationship is doomed. As soon as one recognizes that they *see a tree*, the relation of allowance to the tree is disturbed. The very act of uttering, or even thinking, such a predicative sentence that identifies the tree establishes "the barrier between subject and object," creating an I-It dialogue between the speaker and the tree (Buber 23).

III. The Problem of Writing

The inevitability of this objectification, I contend, confronts Buber with a contradiction that may undermine his formulation of the I-Thou relation. For Buber, there is a difference between the speaker who utters I in an I-It relation, and the speaker who utters I in an I-Thou relation. Since dialogue is the first link in the chain of influence, the nature of this dialogue alters their ontological reality. Their experience in the world has changed. However, there is also a difference in ontological constitution between the addressee who is spoken to as an It, and the being who is spoken to as a Thou.

An object among objects, open to our perception, Buber names It. This kind of being "is set in the context of space and time" (Buber 33). It has the quality of concreteness, of being able

to appear to the human consciousness. It is these kinds of objects that we have knowledge of, that may be intellectualized and interpreted (Buber 40). By contrast, a Thou "is not set in the context of [space and time]" (Buber 33), but rather, escapes intellectual, physical concretization. When an object is intellectualized, or transformed into an It, the nature of the thing itself is altered. Its ontological form is different, depending on which kind of relation it occupies to the speaker.

How, then, can Buber provide a faithful account of these relationships? Just as when a speaker utters that they "see a tree," they enter into an I-It dialogue with that tree, when Buber utters that he *perceives* different relationships, he enters into an I-It dialogue with those relationships. By enumerating the nature of an I-Thou relation, Buber makes this kind of dialogue It to his I: they are objects to be described and classified. As readers take in Buber's account, the material is imparted upon their intellect—this relation is for them, also, an It. Thus, if it is true that "objective speech snatches only at a fringe of real life" (Buber 17), and Buber's account of the I-Thou is objectifying, how can his account be said to capture the truth of these dialogical relationships? The addressee spoken to as an It is an object decidedly different from the being spoken to as Thou. If Buber writes about dialogue as an object (It), there is an incongruity between the Thou he experiences, that hangs beyond space and time, and the 'Thou' that he cements into the world through written enumeration. If they are not the same, his written account must be unfaithful to the truth of this relation.

IV. Possible Repairs to the Problem

I have argued that communicating the nature of an I-Thou relation through writing is inherently objectifying. The next step is to ask how philosophy can aspire to capture such phenomena. If Buber can not *write* about this dialogical relationship, how can he communicate it? In the next section, I will look at two possible forms of expression that may avoid producing the objectification outlined above. The first is the Buber's poetic, emotive prose, and the second is the Socratic dialogical form in Plato's Dialogues. Both methods of demonstration, I will argue, are predicative, yet offer brief, escaping glimpses of an I-Thou method of demonstration. This, I will conclude, is the best account one may hope for. As Buber states, the I-Thou is doomed to face objectification, for this is the "exalted melancholy of our fate" (17). Melancholically, I will accept the inadequacy of written communication to account for visceral human experience if one remains faithful to Buber's account of dialogue.

V. Poetic Prose

Buber is not unaware of my proposed bind. His solution is emotive prose that attempts to lead readers into recognition of this discursive phenomenon in their own lives, rather than providing an explicit description (Stevenson 194). For Buber, spirit, the human response to one's Thou, exists within a metaphysical 'middle-ground' achieved through discourse. Spirit is "not like the blood that circulates in you," he stipulates, but "like the air in which you breathe" (Buber 39). Spirit occupies a mediatory position between the I and the Thou of a relation. Buber's prose aims to corral readers into this very 'middle-ground, ' avoiding explicit articulation of the dimensions of an I-Thou discourse, and by extension, an objectifying gaze.

To achieve an I-Thou discourse, Buber reveals, is to: "*Believe in the simple magic of life, in service in the universe, and the meaning of that waiting, that alertness, that "craning of the neck" in creatures will dawn upon you. Every word would falsify; but look! Round about you beings live their life, and to whatever point you turn you come upon being*" (15).

Language, Buber suggests, "falsifi[es]" this discourse (15). He thus urges his readers to look outside the linguistic form and into their own lives to recognize this relation. He tells readers not what they will "come upon" when they turn, but only urges them to do so (15). This poetic prose aims to embody the I-Thou discourse, rather than dissect it using predicative language.

However, for some this style of prose is not an effective method of enumerating metaphysical truths but instead serves to obscure them. For Walter Kaufman, Buber's language "blurs all contours in the twilight of suggestive but extremely unclear language" (24). His text, Kaufman continues, "implie[s] that he himself could not tell its full meaning" (25). How, Kaufman asks, can we distinguish revelations of metaphysical truths through poetic, obscure prose, from emotive language that reveals only fragments of understanding?

Kaufmann's critiques, however, disregard how poetry can preserve the discursive form. "Unclear," but "suggestive" language is perhaps the only linguistic form that communicates without naming a distinct object to be picked about and perceived. Buber's poetic form attempts to evoke emotional, non-intellectual responses in its readers. Rather than perceiving a concrete object, each reader may have their own interpretation of how to execute this "craning of the neck," in order to have the I-Thou relationship "dawn upon [them]" (Buber 15).

Although Buber attempts to keep the I-Thou relationship free from objectification, his project is ultimately futile. Readers of *I and Thou* will inevitably intellectualize Buber's conjecture, or, at the very least, reflect upon and name their own experiences with authentic relationships. These relationships are henceforth doomed, since "only as It" can something "enter the

structure of knowledge" (Buber 40), and they will thus undergo objectification as they are processed and understood.

VI. Socratic Dialogue

A second possible beacon of hope lies in Plato's Dialogues. In the collection of Plato's *Five Dialogues*, he chronicles the trial of Socrates, accused of corrupting the youth in Athens. As Socrates navigates the legal system, he engages in a number of complex and meaningful dialogues, all of which fail to come to a single conclusion on the issues at hand—for example, on the nature of piety in *Euthyphro*—ending in uncertain and unsure aporia. Thus, in his endless questioning on the nature of things, the I with which Socrates pronounces himself is for Buber "the I of endless dialogue," which is "wafted around it in all its journeys," as Socrates moves through the judicial process. This I, for Buber, "never ceased to believe in the reality of men and went out to meet them" (66).

A possible repair to the problem of writing, therefore, may be found in Plato's dialogical form. Plato does not insert his own authorial stance, removing the I of the writer from the text. The form is, in the case of *Euthyphro, Meno, Phaedo*, and *Crito*, a back and forth between two interlocutors and in *Apology*, Socrates' monologue to the jury. However, assuming that Socrates' dialogue is, as Buber postulates, an enactment of authentic human relations, the question remains as to whether this I-Thou dialogue can survive the written form.

I contend that it cannot. It seems as though the same problem which plagues Buber remains in this case. Embodied, the authentic I of Socrates may bind those who come into contact with him in relation. However, when his dialogue is translated and retranslated, written and rewritten, put into the intermediate communication device of a page, this relation does not persist. Socrates is no longer embodied, but rather, his dialogues are transformed into objects for dissection and analysis, given to readers as an *example* of an authentic relationship, not an embodied I-Thou word pair.

Therefore, although *examples* of authentic dialogue may be presented through the written form, and examples of the form of such a dialogue enumerated, it cannot hold from Buber's definition of an I-Thou relationship that a full understanding of this word-pair can be communicated through writing. In whichever form it is communicated, I contend, objectification is introduced through predicative language, which necessarily speaks to the intellect and thus, the It of each reader.

VII. Reformulating the I-Thou Relation

This problem, as it has been stated, hinges on the fact that the I-Thou, objectified within an I-It framework, becomes a different thing altogether. By providing a written enumeration of this relation, Buber forces it to conform to the dimensions of time and space. How, then, can his description be true to form? Perhaps, Buber's premise that these are two exclusive ontological realities must be revised.

What if we understood the I-It and I-Thou word pairs not as distinct ontological realities but rather, two methods of confronting the world overlaid upon each other. In his essay *I-Thou and I-It: An Attempted Clarification of Their Relationship*, W. Taylor Stevenson pushes against the idea that the human experience in the world can be limited to two polarized realms. Perhaps, he suggests, the I-Thou relationship is not exclusive but rather, "our experience is a relatively stable compound made up of elements from both realms" (Stevenson 196). If the two modes of being are understood to be intertwined, Buber's essay may be able to capture their nature, without encountering the problem of writing.

I propose a reframing of the interaction between these two word-pairs, according to which they do not exist in opposition, but rather, are interwoven, laid upon each other. Then, the written form can be understood as entangled between these two poles—Buber's poetic prose provoking glimpses of the Thou in his readers, just as Socrates' dialogical form points to an embodied (non)authorship. If the I-Thou is not exclusive, it is not necessary to dismiss these written dialogical forms for their predicative language, for they may simultaneously objectify and express an understanding of the world wherein all beings are given their own centrality. Dialogue is not *all or nothing*, objectifying or embodied, but a melody of both worlds woven together.

VIII. Conclusion

This essay has explored Martin Buber's philosophy of language, or, more aptly, his philosophy of dialogue. Buber seeks to characterize two possible ontological relationships created through dialogue—objectified or embodied. However, writing is an inherently predicative form, in which visceral experiences are given a name, and phenomena is enumerated using a finite lexicon. It is an intellectual exercise that creates an I-It relationship between author, reader, and material. Thus, the Thou Buber experiences, and the 'Thou' he writes about, are not the same objects. Although Buber's poetic prose, and Plato's Dialogues, may provoke emotional movements towards the Thou in readers, they cannot be separated from their It framework. The only escape, I have argued, is if these two word-pairs are not held in opposition, but rather understood as enmeshed.

This discussion touches on the role philosophy has in explaining the human condition. It toys with, but never directly asks, the question of whether philosophy truly brings us out of Plato's cave, or perhaps, whether we should desire to be brought out of the dark. If our condition is characterized by inauthentic, predicative relationships, and seeing the true form of others is found in forsaking this objectification, does philosophy impede our ability to see one another? Does it objectify our embodied experience in the world by providing arguments, explanations, and names for the visceral things we experience? Is truth to be found through investigation? Perhaps, Buber suggests, truth is found when we abandon the impulse towards examination, allowing the world to appear to us as more than the sum of its parts.

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Phot. Procédé DRUET

Hommage à Madame Nelson Robinson Auguste Rodin

Fanon on Resistance as Opacity

Abygail Gill

This essay looks at elemental, pre-reflective forms of resistance described by Fanon throughout his work. The colonial "regime of truth" constructs the native as indistinguishable from Nature and as its part and parcel. Colonial knowledge formation through taxonomy is a fundamental instrument of the colonizer and is the appropriation of the native. In this essay, I argue that the right to render oneself opaque and unintelligible is an elemental, or "passive" form of resistance that the colonized has access to and practices in quotidian life. Opacity is a way of working in undertones and presents itself in the failure, or slippage, of the regime of truth. I use Glissant's notion of opacity to work through how colonial knowledge makes the native legible and transparent for domination, and how unintelligibility is resistance.

Keywords: opacity, transparency, fugitivity, pathology, confessional subject, resistance, refusal, Fanon, Glissant, Hartman.

Napoléon le Grand's invasion of Ottoman Egypt (1798) included the expedition of French intelligentsia to Egypt who authored the multi-volume *Description de l'Égypte* (1809-1828). Invasion is not merely material, but, in fact, requires the knowledge production of empire. *Description de l'Égypte* documents and classifies Egypt's "Nature." The native Egyptian is not distinguished from their natural environment, and the taxonomy of fauna and flora *includes* the native in *Description*. The English colonization of Egypt involved the same reduction of the native, with English orientalist Edward Lane later writing his anthropological account of the native in *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*. The Egyptian's temperament, mentality, and customs are established by "an immutable law" present in the Orient (Said 86).

According to Said, *Description* is not merely discursive, but can be understood "as the great collective appropriation of one country by another" (Said 84). Taxonomy and colonial categories are invented for administrative purposes but are also produced for European curiosity and enjoyment. They constitute colonialism's "regime of truth," and its appropriation of the colonial Other through objectivity and legibility.

Said summarizes the "goals" of *Description* very clearly: to make unknown, conquered Nature legible and transparent. *Description* "[formulates] the Orient, [gives] it shape, identity, definition," makes Nature legible and conquerable for imperial strategy (Said 86). Egypt became "total" and transparent through the formation of the colonial regime of truth by "[dividing… schematizing, tabulating, indexing"] land and people (86).

This "engulfment" of the colonized by Western power is a form of epistemic violence, and calls into question how legibility of the colonial population is a form of colonial control and domination. If transparency is an instrument of colonial power, then it must be refused or resisted in some capacity by the colonized. It is a knowledge of possession and appropriation that results from the devising of and application of colonial categories and "truths" onto the native.

Fanon's work touches on colonial taxonomy and the Western gaze on colonized land in *Wretched of the Earth*. For the colonizer, the native Algerian is part of the "landscape, the natural backdrop" for French colonization (Fanon, *Wretched* 182). If the colonized is part of Nature and has the "inner tension of a stone," the construction of the "human" (European subject) depends on this collapsing of the native into ecology (Fanon, "North African" 12). That is, the colonizer is oppositional to Nature, and separate from its landscape. Therefore, the colonizer has the capacity to master Nature, which is fundamentally unruly. However, the colonial fixation on "understanding" and classification of land and native can and must be disrupted.

In this essay, I will argue that the "right" to render oneself opaque is an elemental, or

passive form of resistance that the colonized has access to and practices in everyday life. Opacity is a way of working in undertones, and the possibility for opacity presents itself in the failure, or slippage, of the regime of truth itself. While I do not make claims about the development of resistance or political subjectivity for the masses, [1] I maintain that opacity is fundamental to disrupting the "colonial machine," if the Western regime of truth and discursive practices are fundamental to conquest. I will begin by discussing the colonial "regime of truth" and Glissant's notion of opacity. Then, I will discuss Fanon's psychiatric method in relation to his notion of passivity versus activity, and the "beginnings" of resistance through touch or "feeling touched that refuses" (Al-Saji 15). Third, I will look at instances of unintelligibility and the *failures* of colonial categorization to reveal the fragility of colonial knowledge. I will center my focus on Fanon's discussion of indolence and the confessional subject as examples of how opacity, as an elemental, pre-reflective form of resistance, destabilizes and potentially disassembles the "colonial (knowledge) machine."

The Colonial Regime of Truth and Opacity

How is the "regime of truth" forged? The gaze is diagnostic and fixes the colonized to the stereotypes of the colonizer, leading to a colonial subject who is "overdetermined from without" (Fanon, *Black Skin* 116). The "objective" gaze of the colonized "fixes" as it "[dissects"] the colonized (Fanon, *Black Skin* 116). It appears that the colonized subject is *not* capable of truth, not onlybecause the colonized's testimony of their own oppression is always ruled deceptive, but because the ontology of colonization "does not permit us to understand the being" of the colonized (Fanon, *Black Skin* 110). The colonized "is comparison": they can only come to "understand" themselves in the colonial world through refraction (110). In other words, the self-perception of the colonized is conditionedthrough the repertoire of "objective examination" from the colonial regime of truth (Fanon, *Black Skin* 112). The historico-racial schema which is made up of the "thousand details, anecdotes, stories" collapses and naturalizes the body (Fanon, *Black Skin* 111). There is always an application of categories, taxonomies, or diagnostics, but colonialism's failure to account for the colonized outside of the space of non-being means that there is slippage. This failure provides the possibility for opacity.

Glissant writes in *Poetics of Relation* that each distinct cultural group has a "right to opacity" (Glissant 189). For groups subject to the violence of Western "objectivity" and transpar-

1. There is the perspective that elemental forms of resistance, which manifest pre-reflectively, biologically, develop into organized political action.

ency, opacity is material for fugitivity.

Transparency is oppositional to opacity. Western thought is invested in making things—flora, fauna, people—transparent, legible, and dissectable. Transparency is dependent on a "measuring up" to Western truths. Understanding involves measuring an individual's "solidity with the ideal scale providing me with grounds to make comparisons and, perhaps, judgements" (189). It is appropriative, reductive, and also non-relational because it produces hierarchy. (Glissant 191-2). Transparency is the act of grasping for appropriation, since the West "[moves its hands]" to grasp "its surroundings" (Ibid 189). Its initial interaction with colonized space is by default one of possession. The West's surroundings are, in fact, the native's land. It brings the colonial surroundings back to itself as a gesture of enclosure and appropriation.

Opacity is resistance to colonial taxonomies, classifications, and truths, which are both reductions and appropriations. Application of categories, such as psychiatric diagnoses in the colonial context, is part of this reduction, which is in turn the application of universal truths.

Transparency begins with the colonizer scoping out Nature. The colonizer catalogues the landscape of its conquest;"The natural backdrop for the French presence" is made up of "the Algerians, the women dressed in haïks, the palm groves, and the camels" (Fanon, *Wretched* 182). By making the landscape discernible through scientific classification, illustrations, nomenclature, etc. , it becomes possible to reduce, tame and appropriate Nature which is "hostile [and] ungovernable" (182).

Passivity versus Activity

It is through an understanding of Fanon's psychiatric method that his ideas of resistance, notably in its elemental forms, become clear. Fanon writes, "As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient become conscious of his unconscious," both to abandon the unconscious desire to become white, but also to "act in the direction of a change in the social structure" (Fanon, *Black Skin* 100). The goal of psychiatry for Fanon is not purely individual if there is both a "need for combined action on the individual and on the group" (100). Nor is psychiatry about achieving a feeling of "normalcy" within said structures. The psychiatrist does not direct the patient to accept structures by advising them to "accept and stay in their place." When the individual becomes cognizant (*conscientiser),* the possibility of existence moves beyond the "dilemma" of either whitening or disappearing (100).

The psychiatrist must put the subject in a position to choose "action (or passivity)" towards social structures which constitute the source of the colonized's conflict (100). Otherwise,

the colonized will accept dependency. Although Fanon puts the word passivity in brackets, passivity is not secondary to, or an afterthought, of the "political" (the realm of action). Rather, passivity, in its phenomenological sense, is the lowest form of activity. There might be a tendency to view *legitimate* forms of resistance as political, or even to view the elemental forms of resistance as negligible to the "grand scheme of things."

Passivity is important with regard to the question of fugitivity. Certain forms of resistance do not correspond to the "template or grid" of what is "formally political" (Hartman, *Belly of the World* 171). There are forms of resistance or refusal which are not within the "grand narrative of revolution," perhaps because "strategies of endurance and subsistence" are not recognized as political achievement (Hartman, *Belly of the World* 171). [2] However, fugitivity is important for thinking about this elemental form of resistance, especially when Hartman indicates that "*mere survival* is an achievement in a context so brutal" (171). Such forms of resistance do not dismantle structures but are an orientation of refusal towards said structures.

Spasming, or tensing of the muscles, and sensitivity are examples of "a way of feeling-touched that refuses," which can be a resource for more "liberatory" or transformative politics (Al-Saji 15). What is identified as a pathology, is, in fact, a physiological pulsion of survival. The French observed muscular tensions in the Algerian which were assumed to be a product of war. These "systemic muscular contractions" were attributed to illnesses of the cerebral cortex in the Algerian, despite these tensions existing in the colonial context prior to the Algerian Revolution (Fanon, *Wretched* 217). The doctors classified the pathology as a "congenital stigma" specific to the native which is an "original feature of his nervous system" (217). Yet, Fanon understands these muscular tensions as biology's way of responding to colonialism as a form of refusal. Muscular rigidity is "reticence and refusal in the face of the colonial authorities" (217). In conditions of a "context so brutal," of conquest and subjection (but not of acceptance), there seems to be a semi-permanent condition to stay on guard in self-defence. Yet, being "on hold" is seen as the North African's "inner tension of a stone" or stagnation (Fanon, *North African* 12), which is part of an "extrapyramidal system" in the colonized (Fanon, *Wretched* 17). There is an overt rejection of colonial domination through the many forms of resentful behaviour and refusal, and the native attempts to push away to colonial world as much as possible (Fanon, *Colonialism* 150).

Fanon places a great deal of importance on this muscular tension when developing a new

2. This is further compounded by resistance which may be gendered. Hartman details reproductive labours, or what I like to call gestational labours, taking place in the domestic sphere, which foster Black life.

concept of the human. Fanon sees it necessary to "tense our muscles and our brains in a new direction" (Fanon, *Wretched* 236). I am inclined to think that it is this passage in *Wretched of the Earth* which has led certain readers of Fanon to understand how affectivity develops into more liberatory, radical forms of resistance. [3]

I think what is considered to fall outside of the domain of politics, such as self-preservation, must be considered an important form of resistance. What falls outside of the domain of politics can work in undertones, which become hidden from the view of the colonizer or occupier. This is, of course, not a suggestion to do away with radical politics. Rather, the argument for elemental forms of resistance can go two ways. They can be seen as leading to political subjectivity, and then, possibly radical change. Or, forms of resistance are simply important in and of themselves because they are disruptive or an inconvenience to the colonizer.

Self-preservation also exists through indolence. The colonized can mobilize laziness as a form of opacity. If the colonizer categorizes the colonized as indolent and vehemently protests the "so-called indolence of the black, the Algerian, and the Vietnamese," then in following through with stagnation, the colonized executes the failure of the colonial diagnostic (Fanon, *Wretched* 220). The regime of truth fabricates scientific reasoning to explain how colonized is inherently lazy.

I think notions of colonized indolence are inextricably tied to the question of Nature if the European understands the colonized *as* Nature. Though Fanon does not write about environmental determinism directly, notions of African indolence have frequently relied on a "scientific" environmental determinism to explain *paresse;* the colonizer claims that "tropical heat combined with [an] alleged abundance of tropical natural conditions [is] responsible" for this sluggishness (Fanon, *Wretched* 182;Thompson 71-2).

Instead, indolence is a "conscious way of sabotaging the machine" in its relationship to labour (Fanon, *Wretched* 220). In response to the dire conditions of colonialism, the capacity for "hostility," or the outright rejection of the colonizer's orders, is diminished (Fanon, *Alienation* 529). Before jumping to questions of radical change, I think it is important to consider how the colonized can exercise their autonomy. We must also account for a more general question in our conceptions of resistance, struggle and liberation: who has access to the "political?" If the colonized cannot be "hostile" without consequence, then at least the act of slowing down to "perpetuate the actual state of things" disrupts capitalist modes of production for the colonizer (529).

3. For example, Fred Moten maintains this position in his discussion of muscular tension.

Opacity also allows for the self-preservation of the colonized, which is why Fanon emphasizes the importance of nutrition throughout his work. If colonialism provides the absolute minimal amount of nutrition for workers to continue to labour, then the context of forced labour suspends the worker between life and death. Only through indolence can one preserve their energy. [4]

Failures of Colonial "Truth" and Objectivity

Opacity arises out of the failures of colonial "truth" itself. The Algerian School's psychiatric detailing of the "uniform concept of the African" is evidence of this failure (Fanon, *Wretched* 227). For the Algerian school, characteristics of the African brain are dissimilar from the European brain. This Western psychiatric categorization requires new neuroscientific categories. There is a diversity of climate in Africa, yet the Algiers School's data from the "east, west, and south," rule out that there is an "essential similarity" in the structure of the brains of Africans across the continent (Fanon, *Wretched* 227). If physical environments are used to account for *paresse*, and Africa has a diversity of climate "east, west, and south," then it would follow that the Algiers' School would have been able to draw out the nuances between the different structures of the African brain based on these geographic distinctions.

The inability to diagnose also opens up the space for opacity. Fanon's detailing of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) test done on Muslim women is a study of this failure. The TAT is a projective test which "consists [of] presenting an individual with a series of situations … enabling a restructuration of this field for the ego" (Fanon, *Alienation* 427). Despite the test's purpose of drawing the women's own projections, the images presented are derived from the "specific cultural characteristics… rhythms of life, customs, [and] social truth" of the Western world (428). While the European women could "enter immediately into the picture card," the Muslim women could not make projections on the photocards (428). Fanon, who does not believe in the abolition of psychiatry, but in the application of a critical and decolonial psychiatry, does not rule that Muslim women lack creative capacities, unlike their European counterparts. An application of an uncritical (Western) ethnopsychiatry would attribute the Muslim women's inability to project onto the "foreign… heteroclite" world of the cards to the scientific objectivity of a "genetic constitution" as part of a "general framework of some primitivism" (431).

4. It can perhaps be even taken further to say that the pleasure of food in Blida-Joinville is furtive ground for a form of fugitive resistance. That the sensual pleasure of food is also an investment in the body which has been "taken and given back" to the colonized.

of communication between patients and hospital staff also sets up this non-relationality.

The first thesis of the "North African Syndrome" states that the North African causes "misgivings" for staff with regards to the man's "reality of his illness" (Fanon, *North African* 4). When the North African man cannot account for his symptoms and their frequency, he produces a "frustration in the field of explanation" (6). There is an inability to "understand" or make the man's pain legible in medical and diagnostic terms, and only approximations can be made. Yet, the man's testimony of his own pain and sensation is pre-determined by his being a pathological liar in the eyes of the colonial doctor. The localization of his pain is understood as inconsistent and incoherent, and he cannot produce "truth regarding himself" either (Lorenzini and Tazzioli 81). Pathologized behaviours are based on the denial of the North African's pain and illness because it escapes Western medical diagnosis.

Refusal in the Confessions

The totalizing effects of colonialism are evident in the collaboration of the different institutions of society. In the case of the law, the psychiatrist or the "expert" is involved in the practice of medical jurisprudence and is tasked with rendering legible the "ideas, values and mental attitudes" constituting the act of the perpetrator (Fanon, *Alienation* 409). The expert determines the truth of the act which is also the truth of the perpetrator. Under the colonial legal system, the dismissal of the act means the act is lived as a "fundamental alienation of his being," whereas to assume the act "assume it means the perpetrator [escapes] from the absurd" and will give meaning to their life (410). [1]

The act is established and understood by the expert, with the expectation that the perpetrator must condemn themself for their fault. Self-condemnation provokes the conscience. In the case that the perpetrator assumes their act, then they may re-enter the social group. The central problem of the criminal process in Algeria is the fact that participation within the social group involved mutual recognition between individual and group, yet recognition does *not* exist between the colonized and "the European group" (411).

Reintegration into the (European) social group upon the act of confession is, in fact, impossible. Recognition must exist prior to the confession. The end of the criminal process, being the sanction, becomes impossible if the "subjective assent" or transformation through confession is not possible (Fanon, *Alienation* 411). The only truth affirmed in the retraction appears to be

1. Fanon's description of the confession draws about discourse about confessional-subject in the history of philosophy, such as in Augustine's Confessions.

the "total separation between two social groups" (412). There is a refusal of the social contract, and implicitly of the European social group. The native's confession might be a "submission… to the power of the judiciary," but it must not be understood as an acceptance of the colonial power (412). It is maintained that the retraction and assertion of innocence with a fundamental silence—which is resistance through unyielding—means that a "criminological understanding proves impossible" and is opaque to the judiciary (416). The capacity to undermine the criminal process means that there is a refusal to conform to the West's "rational understanding." It becomes impossible for the expert to render (reduce) the native to an object of knowledge which it possesses.

Fanon observed that a large percentage of "perpetrators" end up denying having committed the act entirely. What is most interesting about the criminal process is the retraction of the confession. The perpetrator begins by delivering an "integral confession, including the motives, the unfolding of the act and during the investigation, they do not budge on the facts of the act (411). The perpetrator often claims confession was under coercion, and the retraction becomes "definitive and unshakeable" and at a certain point, they simply state their innocence—they do not try and prove their innocence (411). They employ silence as a form of refusal.

Most importantly, when such "conditions make the expert uneasy," this uneasiness arises from the unintelligibility of the crime (411). The criminal process has been undermined by the accused because now "criminological understanding proves impossible" and the actors involved in the criminal process—the experts, the rapporteur, etc—who are responsible for shaping the "truth of the act," cannot produce a legible criminal subject. There is an "orchestration of the lie," which suggests that the perpetrator uses their capacity to render themself and their act illegible to disrupt the judicial process (412). This makes the expert uncomfortable because they cannot proceed to draw from a repertoire of colonial knowledge about the native to construct arguments for the drawing out of a sanction. The chain of argumentation becomes impossible through silence.

There can be a "strategic endorsement of the impossible truth" posed by the contradictions of the "lying North African" which can be embraced (Lorenzini and Tazzioli 83). The possibility of setting the verdict is thrown into disarray when silence, or the refusal to define one's innocence, is employed. Trinh's notion of silence reveals the subversive potential of silence:

> *The use of silence:* On the one hand, we face the danger of inscribing femininity as absence… On the other hand, we understand the necessity to place women on the side of negativity (Kristeva) and to work in "undertones" (Irigaray) in our attempts at undermin-

(Trinh 1987)

Working in undertones, through silence, undermines the criminal process. The act has no actor. The act of refusal to authenticate the social contract does happen on the pre-reflective level. However, the colonized has an awareness of the colonizer's fixation on diagnosis and definition, which in turn leads to a skepticism of colonial institutions. If the native doctor and expert has "acquired the habits of a master," then neither can his thinking be distinguished from it (Fanon, *Colonialism* 132). The native doctor is the "spokesman of occupying power" and has therefore apprehended its knowledge (131).

Again, colonial truths produce the failure of the criminal process if the North African is always a liar. This means that "the problem of the truth is constantly posed" in the colonial context (412). The North African always has "untruthful conduct," and is simultaneously incapable of telling the truth (Lorenzini and Tazzioli 83). This is why Fanon refers to the colonial context as a "living lie" (Fanon, *Wretched* 50). The native must then choose to embrace falsehood if no "truthful" behaviour exists in the first place.

The colonial context produces many paradoxes, despite the colonizer's assertion of the rational European subject as human, or humanitas. In the conclusion of *Wretched of the Earth,* Fanon writes that the "European game is finally over" (Fanon, *Wretched* 236). The opposition of transparency/opacity reveals the ruse of colonialism—it attempts to establish objective truths about the native, yet in doing so has "lost control of reason," and, in fact, has not made its subjects entirely legible (236). Instead, working in undertones by rendering the colonized subject illegible can disrupt the regime of colonial truth.

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Hervé's Doubt: Uncovering Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology Through Photography

Leila Espinoza

This paper delves into Lucien Hervé's architectural photography, arguing that his work communicates a phenomenological interpretation of Le Corbusier's modernist architecture. Utilising the phenomenology of perception explicated by Merleau-Ponty, particularly in his essay "Cézanne's Doubt," the analysis examines Hervé's work as a representation of one's embodied "being-in the world".

Keywords: Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology, photography, Lucien Hervé, perception.

Introduction

The collaboration between the French-Swiss architect Le Corbusier and photographer Lucien Hervé serves as artistic documentation of the former's architectural designs and constructions. This paper delves into Hervé's photography, asserting that his work communicates a phenomenological interpretation of Le Corbusier's modernist architecture. Rooted in the thought of French thinker Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I explore how phenomenological and architectural themes such as perception, the architectural promenade, and horizontality are presented in Hervé's photographs. Drawing parallels with Merleau-Ponty's essay, "Cézanne's Doubt," the analysis examines how Hervé's work serves as a visualisation of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception as a fundamental aspect of one's "being-in the world."

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

Maurice Merleau-Ponty presents his interpretation of phenomenology in his manuscript titled "Phenomenology of Perception," Drawing from the works of Husserl, Fink, and Heidegger, phenomenology as a method was developed to elucidate the basic composition of human experience (Toadvine). Refusing to use objective or deductive explanations, phenomenology takes as its starting point the first-person perspective of experience and serves to describe the structure of experience. It thus brackets metaphysical questions such as those on the nature of reality and its relationship to the mind (Toadvine): as Husserl explains, the phenomenological tradition demands a return "to the thing themselves" (*Logical Investigations, 168*). Merleau-Ponty argues that embodied perception, as the means by which one has access to their environment and understands it, is a fundamental aspect of experience. He thus critiques the Cartesian tradition of mind-body dualism for neglecting the fact that our existence is necessarily embodied.

Merleau-Ponty calls the body's mode of existence "being-towards-the-world," as the body distinguishes itself from all other things by demonstrating affective experience and kinesthetic sense (Toadvine). Artistic expression is central to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology because it demonstrates the interaction between body and world. In his essay "Cézanne's Doubt," Mereleau-Ponty illustrates the painter's endeavor to represent his perception of the world through painting. I will take a similar line of analysis to the interpretation of Hervé's photographs, insofar as it presents the embodied perception which is necessary in order for one to engage with their environment.

Le Promenade Architecturale

The architect Le Corbusier articulates his concept of the *promenade architecturale* as follows: "Architecture is experienced as one roams about in it and walks through it […] so true is this that architectural works can be divided into dead and living ones depending on whether the law of 'roaming through' has not been observed or whether, on the contrary, it has been brilliantly obeyed" (Samuel). I argue that the embodied experience of the building — central to the practice of architecture as described by Le Corbusier — is evident in Hervé's photographs of Le Courbusier's architecture through the formal elements of composition, framing, and contrast. The photographs thus present not the buildings as they exist 'objectively' but as they appear to embodied consciousness, as described by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.

In his photograph titled "Brazilia," the viewer discerns the high contrast between the deep blacks and the bright whites, which emphasizes the shapes and textures of Le Corbusier's modernist building. This focus on the minute physical details of the building—drawn out by the high contrast of the image—draws the viewer into the photograph, creating a sense of a gradual physical advancement through the structure. Through the use of geometry and angles, Hervé crafts a dynamic composition with angular lines and oblique shapes guiding the viewer through the key points of the image. The low-angle perspective aids the viewer in understanding the architectural qualities and precision of Le Corbusier's work by simulating the experience of actually standing in the building. It allows the viewer to experience the scale and proportions of the building, creating a three-dimensional feeling and a sense of depth, resembling the notion of *le promenade architecturale*, wherein viewers engage with fluid spaces as they are drawn into the photograph (Samuel 210).

Le promenade architecturale is also demonstrated in Hervé's photograph titled "Chandigarh". In this photograph, the interaction between the vertical and horizontal lines makes the image dynamic and allows the viewer to perceive the space with the depth and detail that one would while physically occupying the space. The tight framing omits extraneous details, emphasizing the three-dimensional shapes, forms, and proportions of the building. This three-dimensionality of the picture is further brought out by the graduation of tones of grays, blacks, and whites on the concrete—reinforcing the viewer's "being toward the world" and allowing the body to engage in this abstract environment (Toadvine). The photograph immerses the viewer in the image, allowing them to feel as if they are walking through the structure while perceiving, moving, contemplating the architecture and its milieu, reinforcing *le promenade architecturale* (Samuel 210).

Similar to Cézanne's paintings that challenge traditional perspectives, Hervé's use of

framing and angles allows for the viewer to engage with the photographs. His method is very similar to Merleau-Ponty's description of Cézanne:

> What motivates the painter's movement can never be simply perspective or geometry or the laws governing color, or, for that matter, particular knowledge. Motivating all the movements from which a picture gradually emerges there can be only one thing: the landscape in its totality and in its absolute fullness, precisely what Cézanne called a "motif"[., ,] the task before him, first to forget all he had ever learned from science and, second through these sciences to recapture the structure of the landscape as an emerging organism. (*Cézanne's Doubt 6*)

Hervé's use of geometry to capture modernist buildings and their environment allows the photograph to emerge as a fluid space for the viewer to navigate. As such, Hervé's use of composition, contrast, and shadows allow for the viewer to engage with Le Corbusier's notion of *lepromenade architecturale*, in which they engage with various sequences and details of the building. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, Hervé's photograph engages with the viewer's perceptual "being toward the world" to contemplate the architecture and the environment—a visual characterization of the perceptual exchange between the body and its environment, embodying phenomenological reflection (Toadvine).

Perspectivity and Horizontality

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, rooted in the object-horizon structure, finds significant resonance in Hervé's approach to photography (Lee). According to Merleau-Ponty, one perceives through the object-horizon structure to understand the phenomenal world: to see an individual entity requires a holistic understanding of its relation to its environment:

> To see an object is either to have it in the margins of the visual field and to be able to focus on it, or to actually respond to this solicitation by focusing on it. When I focus on it, I anchor myself in it, but this "pausing" of the gaze is but a modality of its movement: I continue within one object the same exploration that, just a moment ago, surveyed all of them. (Lee)

For Merleau-Ponty, to understand and perceive a single object, one must grasp its relation with its surroundings. In other words, one must see the entire picture. This perspective, known as the "synthesis of horizons," allows for one to comprehend the diverse relations between entities within the environment (Lee).

The object-horizon structure is exemplified in Hervé's photograph titled "Bords de la

Seine," The emphasis on geometric patterns created by the tiles on the ground establishes a visual rhythm for the viewer; the dynamic symmetry principle guides the viewer's eye, immersing the viewer within the whole of the image, rather than any specific part of it. The object-horizon structure of the setting of Hervé's photograph is made manifest: in order for one to perceive the individual running across the picture, one must take into account the individual's relation with the environment in a manner guided by the visual rhythm of the image. Hervé's focus on geometric patterns and the interplay of light and shadow aligns with Merleau-Ponty's view that perception involves understanding the experience of an object within a context of relationships to other objects. The synthesis of horizons in Hervé's work echoes Merleau-Ponty's assertion that perception is not fixed but continually evolving.

Moreover, in the photograph titled "The Chapel of Notre-Dame-du Haut; interior view south wall," Hervé's use of long exposure imparts a cinematic quality to the image, evoking the motion blur of a horizontally panning film camera. Emphasizing the subject through depth of field, Hervé creates a sense of distance and depth. The blurred composition, taken from within the chapel, obscures the grid-like composition of the architecture, making it enigmatic, but, at the same time, revealing details that would be obscured by a more traditional, static image. His play of light and shadow transforms Le Corbusier's designs into a dramatic sequence, revealing small details dynamically rather than documenting them statically. The soft highlights and pronounced shadows display the man's embodied figure theatrically, making it more apparent to the viewer's eye. The decision to capture the image in black and white accentuates the contrast between highlights and shadows, allowing the various shades of grey to appear abstract. In this way, Hervé brings the physical chapel to life rather than an abstracted and static image of the chapel by utilizing the physical motion of the camera and by exaggerating the use of shadow and light.

This approach aligns with Merleau-Ponty's argument that seeing an object involves immersion and inhabitation. Consider his example of perceiving a tree; to truly perceive it means to immerse oneself within the tree and its relation to surrounding objects (Lee). The image of this tree is constantly influenced by the dimensions of perception, movement, intention of consciousness, and context. Similarly, "The Chapel of Notre-Dame-du Haut" requires immersion within other elements of the building—windows, lighting, benches—to contextualize the individual on the bench. The man is not fixed in a certain position of space thanks to the use of long exposure that preserves and emphasizes his physicality and dynamism. The photographer purposely does not allow for the man's body to be in focus and leaves a trace of motion in his body. Hervé's deliberate choices in composition, lighting, and perspective reflects the importance of embodied

perception in an individual's Being-towards-the-world and its role in art as outlined by Merleau-Ponty.

In conclusion, Lucien Hervé's photography conveys a phenomenological interpretation of Le Corbusier's architectural works. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty's exploration of perception in Cézanne's art, this essay demonstrated a parallel between Hervé's emphasis on perception and phenomenology through photography and Cézanne's endeavor to convey the phenomenal world through his paintings. By covering both narratives, one is able to understand how Hervé's techniques invite audiences to engage in a dynamic and embodied exploration of Le Corbusier's architectural spaces.

Appendix

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

The Performance of Music in Heidegger: Improvisation, Modification, and Angst Breathe out the Score and into Performance

Sophia Khiavi

Composers have often been reluctant to give up control over their scores and allow their compositions to live truly autonomously—a tangible observation that reveals a friction between the phenomenology of a musical performance and the musical score. This paper explores this friction by drawing clues from Martin Heidegger's *The Event*, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and *Being and Time*, to (1) describe the relationship between an objective, written score and its performance, (2) describe the relationship between the score's composer and that performance of a piece, in order to (3) phenomenologically uncover the ways in which anxiety, as it is understood by Heidegger, is disclosed when people play music, i. e. when people participate in the performance. I reference a recurring theme throughout: the ways in which we interpret (listen to, perform, and compose) music is intimately intertwined with the concepts of being-in-the-world and *welt* – specifically, the interactions between the audience's, performer's, and composer's *heimwelt* and *fremdwelt*. This theme develops the phenomenology of a performance into Heidegger's concept of the strife between earth and world. Aiding in this investigation, I draw on concepts of *Werktreue* (fidelity to the performance) and *Texttreue* (fidelity to the written score) to discover that performers cannot actualize a world-making *Werktreue* without adhering to a dependency on an earthly-bound *Texttreue*. I demonstrate the ways in which improvisation and modification in a musical performance work to elicit *unheimlich* from the performance's reception, prompting angst to breathe out of the score and into the performance.

Keywords: phenomenology, musical performance, Heidegger, being-in-the-world, The Event, The Origin of the Work of Art, Being and Time.

I do not believe that it is possible to convey a complete or lasting conception of style purely by notation. Some elements must always be transmitted by the performer, bless him.
—Igor Stravinsky, Conversations with Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft (1980), p. 138

Introductory Remarks

Composers have often been reluctant to give up control over their scores and allow their compositions to live autonomously. Stravinsky's words come as a surprise, given that he famously and, *ad nauseam*, recorded his pieces with the goal of demonstrating exactly how they were to be performed (Benson 79). Because the composer felt the need to define the performance of his work of art, despite having a written score of his art, he reveals a friction between the phenomenology of a musical performance and the musical score. This paper explores this friction through Martin Heidegger's concept of worldliness: *welt*. This paper explores this problem using the framework of phenomenology. By peeling away the layers of disclosure that occur in a musical performance, I show how the musical performance discloses things unique to the musical score.

This paper will draw on clues from Heidegger's *The Event*, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and *Being and Time*, to (1) describe the relationship between an objective, written score and its performance, (2) describe the relationship between the score's composer and that performance of a piece, in order to (3) phenomenologically uncover the ways in which anxiety, as it is understood by Heidegger, is disclosed when people play music, i. e. when people participate in the performance. I argue that from these clues, it becomes clear that there exists a friction between earth and world which defines the relationship between the score and the performance. This paper will develop this line of clues to conclude that in Heidegger, anxiety is disclosed from the score through the performance, and only through the performance. This paper references a recurring theme throughout: the ways in which we interpret (listen to, perform, and compose) music is intimately intertwined with the concepts of being-in-the-world and *welt* – specifically, the interactions between the audience's, performer's, and composer's *heimwelt* and *fremdwelt*. This theme develops the phenomenology of a performance into Heidegger's concept of the strife between earth and world. All art unconceals and contributes to the strife between the world – the open realm of intelligibility and disclosedness – and the earth – the concealing element which allows the performance of music to produce an unconcealing effect. To better assist in these three sections of analysis, this paper additionally draws on elements from Husserl.

What is the relationship between the written score and the performance of a piece?

The German *Werktreue* represents a director's attachment to an original score's elements without altering its meaning through fanciful interpretation. In discussing his phenomenology of music, Benson describes the ideal of being *treu* – translated as "true" or "faithful." (Benson 5). *Werktreue* is a direct faithfulness to the *Werk* (work) and, indirectly, a faithfulness to the composer, who wrote the *Werk* into its physical score. In *The Event*, Heidegger is concerned with the ontology of experience. The event (such as the performance) is not merely an occurrence in a world, but the point from which a world is constituted (Heidegger, 1996). In the Heideggarain sense, *Werktreue* would then be represented in the "performing of the performance" like the "eventing of the event": not in translation, but in performance, does the work of art become disclosed. We compare *Werktreue* with the parallel concept of *Texttreue*: fidelity to the written score, which normally is included in our expectations for an appropriate *Werktreue* (Benson 5). From these two concepts, we understand that (a) our ideal of *Werktreue* implies great expectations from performers, who cannot actualize *Werktreue* without adhering to a dependency on *Textrreue*. Benson shows that performers are necessitated to adhere to the *Texttreue* to produce a *Werktreue* anyways. Without an effort to adhere to the composer's intended *Texttreue* (an effort demonstrated in the reading of the score), the performer cannot begin an effort to produce *Werktreue*. Secondly, we understand that for Benson (b) our ideal of *Werktreue* elicits a very particular way of thinking about music: "one in which the *work* of music has a prominent place", as opposed to the score's translation (5). Heidegger would agree, since listened music is not praised for the notes having been played correctly, but rather, it is praised for being a "great performance," for having been appropriately *evented*. In Heidegger's *The Origin of the Work of Art*, there is an explication of the *eventing* of art: the process of encountering art which involves the performer's and the audience's participation. In the case of the work of music, its *eventing* takes place in the performance of music as the space in which the art is encountered.

Following this preliminary conclusion, I address the relationship between a written score and the performance of a piece via Heideggarian and Husserlian phenomenology. If the performance – the *eventing* – of music is at the core of the work of music, what is the relationship of the score to the work of music?

Husserl's conception of ideal objects is relevant to this discussion. Ideal objects are essentially spiritual entities that have an ideal rather than real existence (Husserl 260). Ideal objects, that do not have an existence in space and time, are part of what Husserl terms the "cultural

world" and are created (rather than discovered) by human activity (Husserl 260). Once created, these objects have a timeless existence and can be characterized as "omnitemporal." Husserl's description of these objects is compatible with the score's existence on earth: it is "everywhere and nowhere" and so it "can appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be numerically identical" (260). Included in these objects are plays, novels, concepts, and musical works, which are sheltered from the caprices of the real world that threaten the existence of real objects (Benson 7). Husserl writes: "however much [the Kreutzer Sonata] consists of sounds, it is an ideal unity; and its constituent sounds are no less ideal" (Husserl 21). In this understanding, a performance is the physical disclosure of the ideal identity of the music.

This commentary from Husserl adds a new dimension to the earlier account, drawn from Heidegger, of *Texttreue* and *Werktreue*. Benson argues that Husserl's connection of ideal objects to factual reality means that even the most "free" of ideal objects – those that can readily transcend cultural and historical boundaries – turn out to be "bound" in the sense of being dependent on their textuality (Benson 101). If listened music is ideal to Husserl, it is still bound to a tangible element on earth, embodied by the quality of *Texttreue*. Benson writes that, practically in Husserl, "the written inscription takes precedence over the aural embodiment" (Benson 101): in the real world, if we first hear a piece and wish to play it, we turn to a written text. This is the "free" and "omnitemporal" element in Husserl's analysis, since *Texttreue*, if it maintains its earthly existence, can turn into *Werktreue* anywhere and at any time. However, since the score's existence is always threatened, the existence of the musical work itself, and any performances of the work in the future is threatened, too. The score's fragile existence on earth is dictated by conditions of the earth. This makes the manifestations of *Texttreue* dependent on the conditions of the earth, before a performer even begins reading the score. The dependency that *Werktreue* has on *Texttreue*, because of the expectations on performers established above, makes the manifestation of *Werktreue* additionally dependent on the conditions of the earth. To illustrate this relationship: if Mozart's widow had not been financially embarrassed and had not sold off the manuscripts her husband had left in the house, there would be considerably less Mozart repertoire in writing and in performance today, and the ideal, omnitemporal scores of music could not be performed into works of music.

Since every performance is produced differently from other performances, and therefore differently from the score, the music turns into an "event" because of the performance. To Heidegger, then, the relationship between the score and the performance of a piece is at the crux of the *eventing*. Wallrup (2019) reflects on *Being and Time* to discuss the impact of "attunement"

or mood (*stimmung*) in Heidegger's thinking during the 1930s. In Heidegger, "mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something." (Heidegger, 1996, 129). Wallrup's reading argues this means that we always relate to the world in a mood, and that every world-disclosure is attuned (Wallrup, Breidenbach, 72). In later passages, this paper explores how performance relates to worldhood. Here, however, we can focus on how *Werktreue* can disclose mood.

Through performance, the disclosure of mood breathes through the score. Benson shows how jazz musicians argue that the performer can successfully capture "the spirit of the tune" precisely by ignoring the intricacies of a score (Benson 145). This argument is reflected extensively, as well, by classical composers Mendelssohn and Landowska, among many others. Indeed, sometimes, an improvisation can capture the mood of a piece better than the repetition of the same piece.

The relationship between the score and the performance of the music is all the more defined when we understand the importance of "mood" and the "spirit of the tune" as a fluid element of music. For jazz, the simultaneous composer and performer improvises freely and openly, to produce music that captures the truest *Werktreue*. Performers of classical music, past and present, have changed notes, dropped measures, and changed intended moods to produce their own kind of improvisation (Benson 147), producing a friction between *Texttreue* and *Werktreue* in the music. This means that in jazz, classical, and other music, the musical *work* (regardless of its true-ness), *can be* fluid in performance. The score, no matter the composer's intentional attunement, nor their efforts (as Stravinsky's) to record their piece *ad nauseam* in advance, cannot dictate the performance of a piece.

What is the relationship between the score's composer and the performance of a piece?

This discussion warrants an understanding of the conception of *welt* that emerges from Heidegger's *Origin of the Work of Art*. Heidegger claims that the work of art sets up a world, disclosed through the art, and also sets itself back on the earth, as a tangible artwork that we perceive (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347). Everything in that world occurs through that work of art. The painting *A Pair of Shoes* by Van Gogh, for instance, is produced not just of the matter and form from earth, but "comes to be" by trying to unconceal the peasant's world. The peasant's shoes come from a world distinct from ours; that world is now unconcealed, it surprises us, it discloses to us something different. This "something" is *welt* (world). By unconcealing the world,

the work of art engages in "welten" (worlding), a neologism coined by Heidegger.

In this passage, I identify the active happenings of *welten*, specifically the strife between earth and world, as the crux of the relationship between a score's composer and the performance of a piece. I demonstrate how all art unconceals, and contributes to the strife between the world (the open realm of intelligibility, disclosedness) and the earth (which is self-concealing and shows itself as refusing the disclosure of the world).

For an architectural work of art, like the Greek temple that Heidegger presents, the earth is the stone and the ground. The world that the Greek temple discloses is that of the ancient Greek world and its elements, which were defined by the purposeful beings that lived in that world. The temple is not a mere building: it makes the god present – it conceals the god within its walls (Wallrup, 87). Every artwork has an earth of its own, and in the case of music, the earth is the tangible score. As discussed in the section earlier, the score's earthly dimensions are defined by its fragility. Wallrup (2015) describes the worlds that music discloses, since Heidegger does not deliberately say how the musical world 'worlds' (*Welt weltet*). When Heidegger spoke about the ancient Greek temple, we can assume that there were musicians, too, playing inside or outside the temple, contributing to that world (Wallrup 88). When we observe the ancient Greek temple today, the ancient Greek world is disclosed to us. Because art simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the world in which it is created and received, we can get a sense of different worlds through their art (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347). Similarly, every musical work has its origin in a world with an existing performance culture: an 18th century court in Germany and the 19th century concert halls in Vienna come from different worlds, and thus, their music discloses different worlds. "Music," Wellrup writes, "was thought to depict the affects and then to give expression to the innermost feelings. All of this has to do with the world as an epoch" (Wallrup, 89). Unlike the peasant's shoes and the Greek temple, a musical performance (like poetry, an example by Heidegger) involves a further disclosure, since this work of art is "unbound" from the earth by a performer. In emphasizing this unique form of disclosure, I also emphasize the static nature of the composer's affect on the musical performance. After the performer pursues the composer's intended *Texttreue* – given the hints and notes offered by the composer – the composer is not influential in the performer's manifestation of *Werktreue.*

The work of art thus works to reveal the world to a concealing earth. This constant revealing and concealing – that Heidegger develops into the essential strife between world and earth – is manifested through different artforms , and I argue that one such formis music. In the *Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger describes the world, which, in resting upon the earth, strives

to raise the earth completely (into the light). The world is self-opening, self-disclosing, and cannot maintain anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, "tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there" (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347).

For Heidegger, the fact that there can be no revealing without concealing (and vice versa) is a necessary feature of this strife. Similarly, we find that an art, which works to reveal a world, would not exist without the concealing earth, on which the art is grounded. Drawing back to Husserlian elements, because of the earth, art is "bound" in the sense of being dependent on the textuality of the earth. The temple is bound to the earth by the stone and ground underneath it, Van Gogh's art is bound by the tangible nature of the painting, and music is bound to the earth by the score. However, in the case of music, the strife between earth and world takes an extra dimension – a dimension similar to that of spoken poetry, which Heidegger draws attention to.

We can observe that works of music and poetry are "unbound" from the earth through their delivery, through the performance of the work of art. Poetry and music can disclose a world which "comes to be" while still maintaining material grounds in the earth – Heidegger calls this a "necessary concealment" (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347). In music, this "necessary concealment" comes from the score, which the composer cannot translate into a performance, since the score contains hidden elements that defy definition. Stravinsky himself admitted that the score's "verbal dialectic is powerless to define musical dialectic in its totality" (Benson, 81). To Heidegger, the way that poetry is delivered on earth is a paradigmatic example of unconcealment. Heidegger says that it is wise to recite and listen to poems often, since its "Saying" enriches human existence on earth by showing and extending the world which the poetry discloses (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347). Music, similarly, does work in "Saying" by unconcealing its world in a performance that unbounds from its earthly score and comes alive.

In the case of music, the strife between earth and world further defines the relationship between the score's composer and the performance of a piece, since it unbounds the music from the physical score, once written by the composer. It is therefore the performer's task to perform the "necessary unconcealment" so integral to the eventing of a work of music. The score provides an earthly way of keeping certain elements of a composer's work from changing, but the score cannot embody a musical composition (Benson, 79). There cannot be a completely isomorphic relation between the score and what is heard by the audience in the "Saying" of a performance.

How is anxiety disclosed through music?

People are such that they always go with a world. They are linked to their environments, their worlds: in Heideggerian language, they are *Dasein*, or *in-der-Welt-sein* (being-in-the-world), since Dasein "dwells" within its world (Heidegger, 1962, 12). The world provides the "horizon for existence"; the world does not refer to a totality of physical objects but to a conceptual home – a familiar space – in which we live (Heidegger, 1962, 12). On Heidegger's account, the work of art provides a space in which to dwell (Heidegger, Zisselsberger 329-347). To Heidegger, to *dwell* in a house is not merely to be inside it spatially. Rather, it is to belong there, to have a familiar place there. When listeners, performers, and composers dwell within the world that music discloses, this dwelling simultaneously becomes the act of transforming the music into a musical habitation (Benson 149). Benson adds that, since dwelling inherently involves adding on, replacing, and altering, there is a sense that musical dwelling is always "on the edge" (Benson 151). This is because dwelling involves both the exploration of the boundaries of a given work of art, and also the modification of those boundaries.

Modification may be appropriate or inappropriate, tasteful or tasteless, useful or useless – but, because of the nature of Heidegger's dwelling, it cannot be absent (Benson 151). What does this do to our conception of a piece of music? A musical work of art thus has an identity formed through an interplay of differences between scores, performances, and other modifications. This, I argue, is a clue to understand how anxiety is disclosed through music.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces *anxiety* in which the free, authentic self exists. Fear is fearful of something particular and determinate in the world, but anxiety is indeterminate and directed towardsnothing in particular – in fact, it is anxious of simply *in-der-Welt-sein* (being-in-the-world) (Heidegger 1996). Representing "nothing and nowhere," in anxiety the everyday world slips away from us and our home (or home-world, *heimlich*) becomes uncanny and strange to us (*unheimlich*). Most critically to the following analysis, Heidegger notes that in anxiety, the self first distinguishes itself from the world and becomes self-aware.

Because art involves dwelling, and dwelling involves modification, then musical art, by being dwelled in, is constantly undergoing modification. This statement can also be drawn from the discussion in Section One: there is a friction between *Texttreue* and *Werktreue* because of the necessary improvisational nature of music, from jazz to classical. By improvising, musicians encounter certain possibilities, and make certain decisions and modifications, by virtue of the performer's predisposition to notice and attend to those possibilities and not others (McAuliffe 41). What determines the modifications that the performer makes? McAuliffe does not give a definite

answer, but draws on Heidegger's *Event* to respond that, in the *eventing* of the performance, performers are "taken up by" the world of the musical piece (McAuliffe 42). In other words, the musicians find themselves "in the moment", a moment which determines the way the musical work of art is modified. As Gadamer says, during this moment, during the performance, not only do players 'play' the game but 'all playing is a being-played' (Gadamer 111). We observe that, if the identity of the musical work of art is reliant on that moment, then the world which the music discloses must be reliant on that moment, too.

A musical work of art, an interplay of differences between scores, performances, and other modifications, is the site of the disclosure of anxiety because it discloses an *unheimlich* to the audience and performers. Heidegger shows that *heimlich* becomes clear and conscious to us when we are exposed to *unheimlich*, after which anxiety is disclosed. Musical art discloses an *unheimlich* – but not simply through disclosing the world of the composer (the courts in Germany or the concert halls in Vienna) which comes from the score. The greater *unheimlich* is brought forth through the new and reinvented disclosure of the performer's world by the performer, via their improvisations and modifications to the composer's work. The identity of the piece rests subserviently in the hands of the musician, 'in the moment' and 'taken up by' the piece. The performance evinces anxiety in the audience and performers, the latter which makes decisions from a realm of possibilities, the former which listens without influence. Both parties experience anxiety because both experience an *unheimlich*, completely new and reinvented with each performance of the piece. This *unheimlich* is not found on the score, nor translated, nor replicated ever again.

Shostakovich wrote a Piano Quintet in which the Prelude movement alone changes the time signature twelve times. At its earthly surface, the music has a score that translates Shostakovich's *stimmung* (mood) into its melodies. But if it tries to disclose a world, the performance of the Prelude will struggle to produce the same world, the same *unheimlich*. Certainly, the essence of Shostakovich's *stimmung* will still be respected in a *Texttreue* performance. However, given the slippery nature of time signature changes, musicians have struggled to produce performances of the Piano Quintet in G minor of similar likeness to others. Benson addresses the shortfalls of the "verbal dialectic" of the score, which Stravinsky calls "powerless to define musical dialectic," precisely because it reflects the fear of the composer: that the performance will produce a world different from the one imagined onto the score (Benson 81). The Prelude is reinvented with each new performance; musicians, as McAuliffe writes, make decisions within the realm of possibilities, and in the moment, they invent the new world (McAuliffe 42).

Listening to the Prelude multiple times, performed by different composers, evokes feelings of *unheimlich* every new rendition. This work of art brings about *unheimlich* because it produces a kind of *fremdwelt* (foreign world). To Husserl, we realize and become conscious of our *heimwelt* (home-world) once we encounter the *fremdwelt*, and to Heidegger, encountering a kind of *fremdwelt* produces *unheimlich* and anxiety, individualizing Dasein as a kind of being (Heidegger, 1996). Through the encounter with the *fremdwelt*, Dasein becomes conscious of its *heimwelt*. After experiencing Shostakovich's Prelude, the musicians and the audience have experienced a new *welt*. They encountered a different *fremdwelt*, never produced before; and from this uncanny experience, their Dasein becomes conscious of the *heimwelt* they live in, outside of this work of art. In the newfound consciousness of Dasein, they encounter anxiety. The Prelude discloses a foreign world to those that experience it. With each modification, the audience experiences the work of art again: the performer discloses a new world and, along with it, a new mood every time. The composer is performing while writing the score, and the performer is co-performing with the composer, making decisions, modifications. The site of the musical performance is, therefore, the site of *unheimwelt.*

Final Remarks

We see that art calls attention to its own playful nature. Art very transparently discloses itself as a site of worldly disclosure. In the meantime, art's earthly elements bound and conceal the work of art. Heideggarian principles identify the work of art as a space in which the audience, performer, and composer dwell together, working to reveal a world to a concealing earth. This paper has demonstrated how music, as a form of art, works out these principles.

In describing (1) the relationship between an objective, written score and its performance, I have found that the score comes alive through the "eventing" of a performance. To discuss (2) the relationship between the score's composer and the performance of a piece, I addressed the strife between earth and world, which manifests in a musical performance by having it "unbound" the music from the physical score. Drawing on these prerequisite conclusions, I found that (3) music, as a site of disclosure of the world, is also a site of improvisation, modification, thereby producing *unheimwelt*, specifically when music is performed. These conclusions led the paper to phenomenologically uncover the ways in which anxiety is disclosed when people perform music.

Stravinsky recorded his pieces to prevent the performance of his pieces from producing an interpretation different from what Stravinsky intended from the score. His worry rested in the

different *welt* (world) that would otherwise become disclosed by the performers to his audience. Stravinsky's worry rested in a divergence within the strife between a worldly, unbound performance and an earthly, bound score. On the other hand, Shostakovich's Prelude is a piece of art so deeply unbound from the tangible score, so free to improvise, modify, that it necessarily invokes angst. In the works of Stravinsky, Shostakovich, and all composers, musicians partake in a beautiful dance that mobilizes improvisation, modification, and angst to breathe out of the score and into the performance.

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